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I. Introduction 
Consider the following hypothetical: Pinkies Bakery, a leading 
national producer of crumpets and other baked goods, is suing Mr. 
Jones, a former executive with the company. Mr. Jones parted 
amicably with Pinkies after his wife’s job transferred the family 
out of state. But, when Mr. Jones seeks employment with another 
grocery manufacturing company in an executive role, Pinkies 
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attempts to block this employment, even in the absence of a 
non-compete agreement.  
Mr. Jones worked for Pinkies as an executive for ten years. 
Pinkies relies on a secret formula to achieve the special light and 
balanced consistency of their crumpets. Mr. Jones worked 
diligently for the company and moved up in its rank during the 
course of his ten-year career with Pinkies. Because of the nature 
of his job, he was one of the few key executives at Pinkies with 
access to the secret formula. Mr. Jones had fifteen years of 
experience as a bakery executive before working at Pinkies. The 
job that Mr. Jones performed is highly specialized. Also, there are 
few positions available for seasoned bakery executives and few 
skilled individuals who can fill these positions. 
Pinkies sues Mr. Jones for trade secret misappropriation on 
the theory that he will necessarily use the secret formula 
information in his new job with another manufacturer of baked 
goods. Mr. Jones did not leave Pinkies with any proprietary 
documents and does not intend to disclose any of Pinkies’ 
information to his new employer. However, simply on the basis of 
having worked for Pinkies, Mr. Jones faces a major dilemma: take 
the new job in a field that is suited to his training and twenty-five 
years of experience and face a lawsuit, or be forced to find 
employment in a different field, in which he is not skilled, in order 
to avoid being sued by his former employer.1 
Businesses have a legitimate interest in protecting their 
proprietary information.2 Maintaining mobility of labor remains a 
key interest to at-will employees.3 “Historically, the law has sought 
to balance these two interests.”4 However, employers increasingly 
are attempting to prevent employees from taking the knowledge 
                                                                                                     
 1. This hypothetical is inspired by Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 
613 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2010). For a discussion of the facts of Bimbo, see infra notes 
8991 and accompanying text. 
 2. See James Bessen, How Companies Kill Their Employees’ Job Searches, 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 17, 2014) https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/ 
10/how-companies-kill-their-employees-job-searches/381437/ (last visited on Nov. 
25, 2018) (discussing that trade secret protection is important for “motivating 
firms to invest” and that companies have an interest in preventing the misuse of 
their trade secrets) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 3. See id. (recounting the story of Mark Papermaster who was sued by his 
former employer IBM after he went to work for Apple). 
 4. Id. 
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and skills that they possess to new jobs.5 Jimmy John’s sandwich 
chain even requires the sandwich maker, earning eight dollars per 
hour, to sign a non-compete agreement.6 Trade secret 
misappropriation litigation is one way that employers can limit the 
mobility of skilled laborers.7 The introduction of a new federal 
cause of action for trade secret misappropriation, the Defend Trade 
Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA),8 and the cases9 decided since the 
DTSA’s passage indicate that the DTSA significantly tipped the 
scales toward businesses protecting their proprietary information 
at the expense of the mobility of highly skilled laborers.10  
Multiple federal courts recognized and applied the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine in cases brought by employers against former 
employees under the DTSA.11 The inevitable disclosure doctrine 
                                                                                                     
 5. See id. (describing that employers are using trade secret laws to take 
legal action against former employees). 
 6. Neil Irwin, When the Guy Making Your Sandwich Has a Noncompete 
Clause, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2014) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/15/upshot/when-the-guy-making-your-
sandwich-has-a-noncompete-clause.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2018) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 7. See Bessen, supra note 2 (“The number of lawsuits over noncompete 
agreements and trade secrets has nearly tripled since 2000.”). 
 8. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (Supp. IV 2016)). 
 9. See generally Fres-co Sys. USA, Inc. v. Hawkins, 690 F. App’x 72 (3d Cir. 
2017); Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., No.16-C-03545, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 71700 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017); Mickey’s Linen v. Fischer, No. 17 C 
2154, 2017 WL 3970593 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2017); Xoran Holdings LLC v. Luick, 
No. 16-13703, 2017 WL 4039178 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2017); Mid-Am. Bus. Sys. 
v. Sanderson, No. 17-3876, 2017 WL 4480107 (D. Minn. Oct. 6, 2017). The first 
case mentioning the inevitable disclosure doctrine in the context of a DTSA claim 
focuses solely on New York state law and is not critical to the analysis of this 
Note. See Free Country Ltd. v. Drennen, 235 F. Supp. 3d 559, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 10. See generally Fres-co, 690 Fed. App’x at 76; Molon, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
71700, at *1517; Mickey’s, 2017 WL 3970593, at *12; Xoran, 2017 WL 4039178, 
at *6; Mid-Am., 2017 WL 4480107, at *7 (granting injunctions restricting the 
employment of former employees in actions brought by employer); see also infra 
Part VI.C (discussing the DTSA’s labor mobility implications).  
 11. See generally Fres-co, 690 Fed. App’x at 72; Molon, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
71700; Mickey’s, 2017 WL 3970593; Xoran, 2017 WL 4039178; Mid-Am., 2017 WL 
4480107. This Note addresses caselaw published before March 1, 2018. Additional 
caselaw addressing the inevitable disclosure doctrine has been published since 
that date. See also Opus Fund Servs. (USA) LLC v. Theorem Fund Servs. LLC., 
No. 17 C 923, 2017 WL 1156246, at *4 (N.D. Ill. March 5, 2018); Prime 
Therapeutics LLC v. Beatty, No. 18-cv-02715, 2018 WL 5669270, at *6 (D. Minn. 
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allows a business to temporarily enjoin the new employment of a 
former employee by a competitor on the theory that the employee 
learned confidential information while working for that business 
which the employee cannot possibly forget or refrain from relying 
on during her employment with the competitor.12 The application 
of this doctrine under the DTSA is controversial for two reasons. 
First, some states refuse to recognize the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine due, in part, to its restrictive effect on labor mobility.13 
Secondly, the application is controversial because some 
practitioners thought that the language of the DTSA preempted 
the application of this doctrine at the federal level.14 
Some scholars consider the inevitable disclosure doctrine to be 
functionally equivalent to a non-compete agreement because it 
prevents employees from joining a competitor or launching their 
own start-up that would compete against their former employer.15 
The issue with allowing the inevitable disclosure doctrine to 
achieve the same result of a non-compete agreement is that the 
doctrine imposes the same restraints as a non-compete agreement 
in the absence of a contractual agreement between the parties and 
does not allow for the employee to negotiate the terms of such an 
                                                                                                     
Nov. 1, 2018) (conducting an inevitable disclosure analysis in claims brought 
under the DTSA). 
 12. See Tracey Bateman Farrell, Annotation, Applicability of Inevitable 
Disclosure Doctrine Barring Employment of Competitor’s Former Employee, 36 
A.L.R. 6th 537, § 1 (2008) (“Under the inevitable disclosure doctrine, the former 
employer argues that in order to perform the new job effectively, the new 
employee cannot but help but draw upon this information learned in the previous 
employment.”). 
 13. See Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1447 (2002) and 
discussion infra notes 105108 (discussing California’s outright rejection of the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine because of its impact on labor mobility). 
 14. See Erik Weibust & Andrew Stark, The Third Circuit Addresses the 
Defend Trade Secrets Acts and Appears to Have Applied the Inevitable 
Disclosure Doctrine, TRADING SECRETS BLOG (July 11, 2017), 
http://www.tradesecretslaw.com/2017/07/articles/dtsa/the-third-circuit-addresses-
the-defend-trade-secrets-act-and-appears-to-have-applied-the-inevitable-
disclosure-doctrine/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2018) (“Only time will tell whether this 
trend will continue, or if the federal courts will clarify . . . that injunctions keeping 
a former employee out of work may not be based on their alleged ‘inevitable dis 
closure’ of trade secrets.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 15. See Sharon K. Sandeen & Elizabeth A. Rowe, Debating Employee 
Non-Competes and Trade Secrets, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH L.J. 438, 457 (2017) 
(“Even without [a non-compete agreement], some courts apply the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine to prevent an employee from working for a new employer.”). 
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agreement.16 Thus, the inevitable disclosure doctrine’s function as 
a de facto non-compete agreement profoundly impacts innovation 
and the formation of start-ups.17 The application of highly 
restrictive trade secret laws, including the doctrine of inevitable 
disclosure, can hinder employees as well as employers.18 Empirical 
evidence suggests “the average effect of IDD [the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine] on innovation quality . . . is negative.”19 
Concerns exist that an overly pro-employer trade secret 
environment will have a negative impact on innovation.20 For these 
reasons, it is important to analyze whether the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine can and should survive in federal courts in 
claims brought under the DTSA.21 
In light of the DTSA’s recent passage and the restrictive 
effects of the inevitable disclosure doctrine, it is necessary to 
determine whether the DTSA preempts the application of 
inevitable disclosure or if its application will become increasingly 
prevalent in federal courts.22 Applying the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine at the federal level significantly implicates various 
stakeholders, perhaps most negatively, at-will employees. The 
application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine “reflects the 
fundamental tension between legitimate, competing interests: the 
                                                                                                     
 16. See id. (“[Inevitable disclosure] is a highly controversial remedy precisely 
because critics complain that there is no contractual agreement between the 
employer and employee.”). 
 17. See Charles Tait Graves & James A. DiBoise, Do Strict Trade Secret and 
Non-Competition Laws Obstruct Innovation, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 323, 
324 (2007) (“[R]estrictive trade secret rules operate as court-created 
non-competition agreements and all too easily allow former employers to bury a 
new start-up in legal fees and amorphous, ever-changing accusations of trade 
secret theft.”). 
 18. See id. at 327 (challenging the notion that strict non-competition 
agreements and trade secret laws protect innovation). 
 19. Andrea Contigiani et. al, Trade Secrets and Innovation: Evidence from 
the “Inevitable Disclosure” Doctrine 4 (Dec. 1, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 20. See id. at 7 (“An employer friendly trade secret environment may hamper 
the operation of . . . the external labor market, and so raises the possibility of 
dampened individual incentives for innovation.”). 
 21. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (Supp. IV 2016)). 
 22. See Brittany S. Bruns, Note, Criticism of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 
2016: Failure to Preempt, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 48991 (2017) (discussing 
further the preemptive effects of the DTSA on all state trade secret laws). 
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need to protect the employer’s investment in confidential 
information and the need to support free competition and 
movement of labor.”23 Applying inevitable disclosure under the 
DTSA seems to disturb the balance between the public policy 
considerations surrounding the mobility of skilled laborers and the 
economic considerations related to the preservation of a business’s 
intellectual property.24  
This Note addresses whether application of the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine should be permitted in trade secret 
misappropriation claims brought under the DTSA.25 In answering 
this question, this Note first examines the goals Congress intended 
to achieve with this legislation and how application of the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine serves or undermines those goals. 
This Note then looks to the plain language of the statute, the 
legislative intent behind the DTSA, judicial application of the Act 
since its passage, and the normative arguments against the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine.  
This Note proceeds in the following course: Part II addresses 
the relevant history of trade secret law in the United States up 
until the passage of the DTSA and introduces the legislation. Part 
III details the legislative history and Congressional intent behind 
the passage of this Act with a particular focus on injunctive relief 
against departing employees.26 Part IV argues that the language 
of the DTSA fails to preempt the application of the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine. Part V critically examines some of the cases 
decided after the passage of the DTSA, in light of the statutory 
language and legislative intent, to demonstrate the DTSA’s failure 
to preempt inevitable disclosure. Part VI discusses the problems 
with allowing the inevitable disclosure doctrine to survive in DTSA 
claims. Part VII concludes that given the DTSA’s current failure to 
                                                                                                     
 23. JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, § 7.02[2] (2007). 
 24. See SI Handling Sys. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1267 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(Adams, J., concurring) (“[T]rade secret cases frequently implicate the important 
countervailing policies served on one hand by protecting a business person from 
unfair competition stemming from the usurpation of trade secrets, and on the 
other by permitting an individual to pursue unhampered the occupation for 
which . . . she is best suited.”). For further discussion of this case, see infra notes 
330334 and accompanying text. 
 25. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (Supp. IV 2016)).  
 26. Id. 
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preempt the application of inevitable disclosure and the harms 
caused by the inevitable disclosure doctrine, Congress should 
amend the DTSA to preempt the inevitable disclosure doctrine. 
II. Background and Context of Trade Secret Law in the 
United States 
Trade secret law is a branch of intellectual property law. 
Unlike other forms of intellectual property law such as patents, 
trademarks, and copyrights, the federal government does not 
register trade secret information.27 States and various uniform 
codes have developed trade secret law over time, culminating with 
the new federal cause of action for trade secret misappropriation.28 
A. Sources of Law 
Trade secret misappropriation claims historically fell under 
state law.29 Each state enacts its own trade secret 
misappropriation law.30 Through time, various states and the 
Restatement (First) of Torts defined trade secrets differently and 
provided different criteria for plaintiffs to prove that a trade secret 
existed and that it had been misappropriated.31 Courts also 
                                                                                                     
 27. See Sally Kane, Career Requirements and Responsibilities in Trade 
Secret Law, BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/trade-secret-law-2164628 
(last updated Nov. 25, 2018) (last visited Nov. 25, 2018) (“Unlike other forms of 
intellectual property, such as patents, copyrights, and trademarks, organizations 
cannot register their trade secrets with the government to protect their 
proprietary information.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 28. See discussion infra Part II.A (discussing various sources of trade secret 
law and its development over time). 
 29. See Sharon K. Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, Toward a Federal 
Jurisprudence of Trade Secret Law, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829, 832 (2017) (“For 
over 175 years, state law governed civil trade secret principles in the United 
States . . . .”). 
 30. See Malla Pollack, Litigating Misappropriation of Trade Secret, 127 AM. 
JUR. TRIALS 283, § 14 (2012) (detailing the different language of various state 
statutes regarding trade secret misappropriation). 
 31. See id. §§ 79 (detailing the various Restatements that have influenced 
trade secret law in states); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (AM. LAW INST. 
1939) (providing liability for “one who discloses or uses another’s trade secret, 
without privilege to do so”); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 
(AM. LAW INST. 1995) (defining a trade secret as “any information that can be used 
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established trade secret common law as they interpreted state 
trade secret statutes.32 Because trade secret common law 
developed slowly and inconsistently, practitioners and businesses 
sought a “clearly defined” and “uniform” cause of action.33 The 
Uniform Law Commission published the Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act (UTSA)34 to fill gaps left by the Restatement and to bring some 
level of uniformity to trade secret law in the United States.35 Since 
then, forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have adopted 
the UTSA, sometimes with modifications.36 Until the DTSA’s 
passage in 2016, claimants could generally bring civil actions for 
trade secret misappropriation only under state laws.37  
B. Elements of a Trade Secret Claim 
The modern elements of trade secret misappropriation 
generally include: (1) that the plaintiff owned a trade secret; 
(2) the defendant acquired, disclosed, or used the plaintiff’s trade 
secret; and (3) the defendant’s actions damaged the plaintiff.38 The 
                                                                                                     
in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable 
and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others”).  
 32. See id. § 5 (“Prior to the popularity of the UTSA, most cases were decided 
under common law doctrines . . . .”). 
 33. Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts 
Commit Error When They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 
HAMLINE L. REV. 493, 502 (2010). 
 34. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N. 1986). 
 35. See Richard F. Dole, The Contours of American Trade Secret Law: What 
Is and What Isn’t Protectable as a Trade Secret, 19 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 89, 
93 (2016) (describing the development of the UTSA to provide uniformity and cure 
defects in the Restatement definitions). 
 36. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act Enactment Status Map, UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N. (Nov. 26, 2017, 2:05 PM), http://www.uniformlaws.org/ 
LegislativeMap.aspx?title=trade%20Secrets% 20Act (last visited Nov. 25, 2018) 
(demonstrating which states have adopted the UTSA) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 37. See Kris J. Kostolansky & Frances Staadt, The Defend Trade Secrets Act 
of 2016: Reconciling Inevitable Disclosure, 45 COLO. LAW. 37, 37 (2016) (“Before 
the DTSA’s passage, victims of trade secret theft could bring civil actions only 
under state trade secret laws, which vary widely from state to state.”). 
 38. See George L. Blum, Annotation, Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) as 
Preempting Civil Action Not Sounding in Contract and Based on 
Misappropriation of Confidential Information Other than Trade Secret, and 
UTSA as Precluding Plaintiff’s Assertion that Claim Does Not Constitute Trade 
2216 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2207 (2018) 
first element a plaintiff must prove in a trade secret 
misappropriation claim is that a trade secret exists.39 The UTSA 
defines a trade secret as:  
Information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, 
program, device, method, technique or process that: 
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, 
from not being generally known to, and not being readily 
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain 
economic value from its disclosure or use; and  
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.40 
Having established that a trade secret exists, the plaintiff then 
must establish misappropriation.41 To prove misappropriation, 
plaintiffs may need to demonstrate “the acquisition of a trade 
secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know 
that the trade secret was acquired by improper means.”42 Plaintiffs 
may additionally need to demonstrate the “disclosure or use of a 
trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a 
person.”43 Once the plaintiff satisfies the elements of 
misappropriation, the court primarily grants the remedy of an 
injunction.44 Courts look to various legal and factual 
considerations when determining whether to grant an injunction.45 
                                                                                                     
Secret in Order to Circumvent Preemption Bar, 29 A.L.R. Fed. 7th Art. 4 (2017) 
(referencing the elements of a trade secret misappropriation claim under the 
California statute).  
 39. See Pollack, supra note 30, § 14 (listing the elements of trade secret 
misappropriation claim).  
 40. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 14 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N. 1986). 
 41. See Sandeen, supra note 33, at 529 (describing the UTSA’s requirement 
that both the existence of a trade secret and its misappropriation must be 
demonstrated in order to state a successful claim of trade secret 
misappropriation). 
 42. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(i) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N. 1986). 
 43. Id. § 1(2)(ii). 
 44. See POOLEY, supra note 23, § 7.02[2] (detailing that courts will typically 
grant an injunction to stop any future use of stolen trade secret information); see 
also Elizabeth Rowe, Unpacking Trade Secret Damages, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 155, 
16062 (2017) (discussing injunctive relief as a remedy under trade secret 
common law, the UTSA, and the DTSA). 
 45. See, e.g., RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 177 F. Supp. 2d. 859, 876 (N.D. Ill. 2001) 
(analyzing the level of competition between the former and new employer, how 
comparable the position the employer hold is to his former job, and actions the 
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One such legal consideration is whether it is appropriate to apply 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine.46 
C. Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine 
The inevitable disclosure doctrine allows a court to 
temporarily “enjoin a former employee from working for his 
employer’s competitor because of the threat of misappropriation.”47 
The rationale behind the doctrine is that the employee has gained 
knowledge of confidential information while working for that 
business, and the employee cannot possibly forget or refrain from 
relying on that knowledge during her employment with the 
competitor.48 In other words, given the employee’s access to trade 
secret information in her former position, the competitor’s use of 
that information will be unavoidable.49 The inevitable disclosure 
doctrine is a judge-made doctrine, although some states have found 
a textual anchor in the UTSA’s prohibition of “threatened 
misappropriation.”50  
Scholars disagree about what “inevitable disclosure” really 
means.51 James Pooley, one of the foremost experts in trade secret 
law, argues that inevitable disclosure is simply courts applying 
injunctive relief against threatened misappropriation and is not 
                                                                                                     
new employer took to prevent the employee from disclosing the former employer’s 
trade secrets). 
 46. See Farrell, supra note 12, § 2 (detailing circumstances which support 
the court’s application of inevitable disclosure and circumstances which do not 
support the application). 
 47. Ryan M. Wiesner, A State-by-State Analysis of Inevitable Disclosure: A 
Need for Uniformity and a Workable Standard, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
211, 214 (2012). 
 48. See Farrell, supra note 12, § 1 (defining the inevitable disclosure doctrine 
and describing its use in trade secret litigation). 
 49. See Wiesner, supra note 47, at 214 (“The employer must show that its 
employee had access to its trade secrets ‘and the former employee has such similar 
responsibilities with the new employer as to make it inevitable that he 
will . . . disclose those trade secrets in the performance of his [new] job 
duties . . . .’” (quoting DAVID W. QUINTO & STUART H. SINGER, TRADE SECRETS 44 
(2009))). 
 50. See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N. 1986) 
(“Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined.”). 
 51. See Farrell, supra note 12, § 2 (“The doctrine of inevitable disclosure has 
been defined and applied differently by different courts.”). 
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based on information that the individual merely knew through 
previous employment.52 Other authority has found inevitable 
disclosure when a former employee will “inevitably disclose” or use 
their trade secret information upon joining a competitor in a 
similar position as their original job.53  
Typically, an injunction granted on the basis of the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine is temporary in duration or limited to certain 
job positions.54 Inevitable disclosure essentially allows for the use 
of circumstantial evidence to demonstrate “threatened” trade 
secret misappropriation.55 While the inevitable disclosure doctrine 
is a judicially created doctrine, the outcomes in the cases that 
apply inevitable disclosure “depend more on factual variations 
than on doctrinal consistency.”56 In applying inevitable disclosure, 
the central inquiries are (1) whether the defendant possesses 
information that is considered the plaintiff’s trade secret 
information and (2) whether the defendants will inevitably rely on 
that information in subsequent employment.57 However, caselaw 
                                                                                                     
 52. See POOLEY, supra note 23, § 2.05[4] (“In reality, the very notion of 
inevitability, like ‘threatened misappropriation’ begs the question of what proof 
is necessary to establish it.”). 
 53. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying 
inevitable disclosure on the basis that the former employee would necessarily rely 
on information learned at Pepsi in his new job); see Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. 
Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 111 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating that “Pennsylvania law 
empowers a court to enjoin the threatened disclosure of trade secrets without 
requiring the plaintiff to show that disclosure is inevitable”); see also Farrell, 
supra note 12, § 2 (“The type of the job that the employee held with the former 
employer is often important in determining whether he or she will inevitably 
disclose trade secret information . . . by taking a job with a competitor.”). 
 54. See POOLEY, supra note 23, § 2.05[4] (“When the doctrine is applied, the 
outcome [will be] . . . a more limited injunction that . . . forbids participation in 
some particular product line or area of business. Variations on this approach are 
an injunction which will expire in a short time.”). 
 55. See id. § 7.02[2] (“This has led to the so-called ‘doctrine of inevitable 
disclosure’ . . . under which circumstantial evidence strongly indicating a 
likelihood of misappropriation may be sufficient to support an injunction, despite 
the defendant’s protestations to the contrary.”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Kostolansky & Staadt, supra note 37, at 38 (“The relevant inquiry 
regarding inevitable disclosure is whether a former employee possesses 
information that constitutes a trade secret and whether reliance on that trade 
secret is inevitable.”). 
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from different states has individually defined and tailored the 
inevitable disclosure analysis.58 
1. Pre-DTSA Caselaw Applying the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine 
Given the competing definitions of the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine, various courts have articulated and applied the doctrine 
in different ways. The seminal case defining and applying the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine is PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond.59 In 
PepsiCo, the court held that a plaintiff “may prove a claim of trade 
secret misappropriation by demonstrating that defendant’s new 
employment will inevitably lead him to rely on plaintiff’s trade 
secret.”60 The opinion articulated that in this case, the employee 
possessed a demonstrated knowledge of trade secret information 
and would necessarily base decisions made in his new job with a 
competitor on knowledge of that information.61 
PepsiCo involved companies in the highly competitive market 
of sports drinks and “new age drinks,” such as Snapple and 
Fruitopia.62 In 1995, Quaker tried to solidify its lead in this market 
as the distributor of Snapple and Gatorade, while PepsiCo 
attempted to catch up to Quaker with its new sports drink, All 
Sport.63 William Redmond worked as the General Manager of the 
Northern California Business Unit for PepsiCo in its North 
American (PCNA) division, and because of the high-ranking 
nature of his job, Redmond had access to a great deal of PepsiCo 
proprietary information.64 The head of Quaker’s Gatorade division 
                                                                                                     
 58. See discussion infra Part II.C.1 (detailing the different standards and 
definitions applied in an inevitable disclosure analysis). 
 59. 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995). Some pre-PepsiCo cases enjoined departing 
employees from working for competitors, although without referring to “inevitable 
disclosure.” See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Varco Int’l, Inc., 677 F.2d 500, 50405 (5th 
Cir. 1982); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., v. Cont’l Aviation & Eng’g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 
645, 654 (E.D. Mich. 1966); Fountain v. Hudson Cush-N-Foam Corp., 122 So. 2d 
232, 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960). 
 60. PepsiCo, Inc., 54 F.3d at 1269. 
 61. See id. at 1270 (indicating that Redmond would necessarily be influenced 
by the knowledge he acquired at PCNA in working for Quaker).  
 62. Id. at 1264. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. 
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offered Redmond a position as the Vice President of Field 
Operations for the Gatorade division, and Redmond accepted the 
position.65 Redmond communicated with the human resources 
department at PCNA about the offer, but indicated that he was 
unsure if he would accept the position with Quaker.66 The Senior 
Vice President of Human Resources told Redmond to continue 
making planned visits to PCNA customers.67 Two days after 
Redmond accepted the position with Quaker, he informed PCNA’s 
Chief Operating Officer that he had decided to take the position 
with Quaker and was resigning from PCNA.68 
PepsiCo filed suit against Redmond seeking a temporary 
restraining order to enjoin Redmond from assuming his new 
position at Quaker.69 During the preliminary injunction hearing, 
PepsiCo offered evidence of confidential information and trade 
secrets that Redmond had learned in the course of his 
employment.70 PepsiCo identified key documents as trade secrets 
including: PCNA’s Strategic Plan including financial goals and 
marketing strategies; PCNA’s Annual Operating Plan; and 
documentation regarding innovation in selling and delivery 
models.71 PepsiCo argued that because Redmond had “intimate 
knowledge” of this information, he would inevitably disclose this 
information to Quaker through the course of his employment with 
Quaker.72 Redmond and Quaker responded that the information 
Redmond acquired from his work with PepsiCo was irrelevant to 
his position at Quaker and that it would violate the Quaker Code 
of Ethics to misappropriate trade secret information in this way.73 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
upheld the preliminary injunction enjoining Redmond from 
assuming his position at Quaker for over a year.74 The Illinois 
                                                                                                     
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 1265. 
 70. Id. at 1265. 
 71. Id. at 126566. 
 72. Id. at 1266. 
 73. See id. (“Redmond asserted that . . . his special knowledge of PCNA 
strategies would be irrelevant.”). 
 74. See id. at 1271 (upholding the injunction on the basis of Redmond’s 
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Trade Secret Act, which governed the trade secret issue in this 
case, provides that a court may enjoin behavior on the basis of 
“actual or threatened misappropriation” of a trade secret.75 In this 
case, the Seventh Circuit wrestled with defining the certain 
actions that constitute threatened misappropriation.76 The court 
based its decision to affirm the district court’s injunction primarily 
on the “demonstrated inevitability that Redmond would rely on 
PCNA trade secrets in his new job at Quaker.”77 
PepsiCo is not an atypical case; numerous other states adopted 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine as part of their trade secret 
common law.78 Notably, Delaware recognizes the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine, and the first decision to refer to a disclosure 
occurring “inevitably” was a Delaware case.79 Acceptance and 
application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine varies from state 
to state, but the majority of state courts that have addressed the 
doctrine have “endorsed” inevitable disclosure.80  
While many courts have applied the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine, they have not applied it consistently.81 This could be in 
part due to the confusion mentioned earlier: whether inevitable 
disclosure is synonymous with “threatened misappropriation” or 
whether the doctrine only pertains to enjoining former employees 
on the basis of what they know.82 This confusion is especially 
                                                                                                     
threatened misappropriation). 
 75. See id. at 1267 (quoting the Illinois Trade Secret Act, 765 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 1065/3 (West 1988)). 
 76. See id. at 1268 (discussing that there is little law establishing what 
constitutes threatened misappropriation in the Seventh Circuit). 
 77. Id. at 1271. 
 78. See Wiesner, supra note 47, at 21728 (detailing multiple states’ 
positions on the inevitable disclosure doctrine). 
 79. See E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 
200 A.2d 428 (Del. Ch. 1964) (“Plaintiff says that on this record an issue is created 
as to whether disclosure will inevitably or probably follow from Hirsch’s 
employment . . . .”). 
 80. RANDALL E. JAHNKE, ET. AL., DOCTRINE OF INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE 14 
(2008), http://www.ipo.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/DoctrineofInevitableDisclosure.pdf; see also Wiesner, 
supra note 47, at 21728 (detailing which states have endorsed the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine). 
 81. See JAHNKE, supra note 80, at 14 (“Even in states that have accepted the 
doctrine, application has been uneven . . . .”).  
 82. See id. (“[Application has been inconsistent] primarily due to 
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apparent because the UTSA specifically recognizes injunctive 
relief on the basis of threatened misappropriation.83 However, 
some states that have adopted the UTSA do not recognize the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine.84 Other states that have refused to 
adopt the UTSA’s language of injunctive relief on the basis of 
threatened misappropriation accept the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine.85 This Note now explores additional caselaw to highlight 
the inconsistent application of inevitable disclosure and 
demonstrate how different courts apply distinct inevitable 
disclosure analyses.  
Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella86 serves as another 
influential case in the canon of inevitable disclosure jurisprudence. 
Although the facts in Bimbo resemble the facts in PepsiCo,87 the 
court’s application of inevitable disclosure in Bimbo is significantly 
different than the application of the doctrine in PepsiCo.88 
Botticella worked as a senior executive at Bimbo, one of the largest 
companies in the United States bakery business.89 As an executive, 
Botticella had access to confidential information including 
formulas and strategic business documents.90 Boticella accepted a 
job with a key Bimbo competitor, Hostess, as their Vice President 
of Bakery Operations.91 A computer forensics expert presented 
some evidence that Botticella accessed a number of confidential 
documents inconsistent with his prior document usage in the 
                                                                                                     
misunderstandings regarding the role of the doctrine in reference to the 
threatened misappropriation . . . .”). 
 83. See id. (describing the UTSA’s “specific reference to threatened 
misappropriation”). 
 84. See id. (indicating that at least some states believe that applying the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine means something different that granting injunctive 
relief on the basis of threatened misappropriation). 
 85. See id. (remarking that California has accepted the UTSA but rejected 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine, while New York and New Jersey have not 
adopted the UTSA but do accept the doctrine). 
 86. 613 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 87. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 88. Compare Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 102 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (requiring the disclosure to be “substantially” likely and not requiring 
plaintiffs to demonstrate that the disclosure is inevitable), with PepsiCo, 54 F.3d 
at 1262 (focusing on the inevitability of Redmond’s disclosure). 
 89. Bimbo, 613 F.3d at 105. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. 
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weeks leading up to his departure from Bimbo.92 After Botticella 
left Bimbo to work for Hostess, Bimbo brought a trade secret 
misappropriation action under the Pennsylvania Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act and moved for a preliminary injunction.93 The district 
court found that there was “a substantial likelihood, if not 
inevitability, that [Boticella] will disclose or use Bimbo’s trade 
secrets in the course of his employment with Hostess.”94 
On appeal, the Third Circuit agreed with the district court 
that Pennsylvania law “empowers a court to enjoin the threatened 
disclosure of trade secrets.”95 However, the opinion stated that the 
District Court enjoined the threatened disclosure on the basis that 
the disclosure was likely rather than inevitable.96 The Third 
Circuit decided that courts may appropriately enjoin the 
threatened disclosure even without determining whether the 
disclosure was in fact inevitable.97 The Third Circuit affirmed the 
District Court’s statement that the “proper inquiry” in granting an 
injunction to prevent the threatened disclosure of trade secrets is 
“not whether a defendant inevitably will disclose a trade secret in 
the absence of injunctive relief, but instead whether there is 
‘sufficient likelihood, or substantial threat, of defendant doing so 
in the future.’”98  
2. States that Reject the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine 
In contrast, some states have barred the application of the 
doctrine entirely. Courts in the Eighth Circuit, California, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, and Massachusetts expressly 
refused to adopt the inevitable disclosure doctrine.99 Whyte v. 
                                                                                                     
 92. Id. at 107. 
 93. Id. at 108.  
 94. Id. at 110 (quoting Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, No. 10-0194, 
2010 WL 571774, at *1114 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2010)). 
 95. Id. at 111. 
 96. See id. (“In other words, the District Court concluded, albeit 
paradoxically, that Pennsylvania courts apply the ‘inevitable disclosure doctrine’ 
to grant injunctions not based on a trade secret’s inevitable disclosure, but on its 
likely disclosure.”). 
 97. Id. at 111. 
 98. Id. at 116. 
 99. See Farrell, supra note 12, § 7 (listing the courts and jurisdictions that 
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Schlage Lock Co.100 demonstrates the reasoning of some states in 
deciding to reject the inevitable disclosure doctrine.101 This 
California case relied on PepsiCo to articulate the justification for 
courts to apply the inevitable disclosure doctrine.102 However, the 
California court ultimately rejected PepsiCo’s reasoning and 
refused to accept inevitable disclosure.103 The decision 
acknowledged that the majority of jurisdictions that addressed the 
issue adopted the inevitable disclosure doctrine in some form.104 
Nonetheless, it balanced employee mobility and protecting trade 
secrets to reject the inevitable disclosure doctrine.105 The opinion 
articulated two major considerations in rejecting inevitable 
disclosure: (1) the affect on employee mobility and (2) the fact that 
inevitable disclosure essentially acts as a non-compete agreement 
imposed after the fact of the initial employment agreement.106 The 
California court “complete[ly]” rejected the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine.107 The court refused to grant an injunction affecting the 
mobility of labor based solely on an inference that an employee 
may inevitably disclose trade secret information.108  
                                                                                                     
have rejected the inevitable disclosure doctrine). 
 100. 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443 (2002). 
 101. See id. at 145862 (rejecting the inevitable disclosure doctrine on the 
basis that inevitable disclosure hinges on circumstantial evidence to restrict 
employment). 
 102. See id. at 145859 (“The [inevitable disclosure] doctrine’s justification is 
that unless the employee has ‘an uncanny ability to compartmentalize 
information’ the employee will necessarily rely . . . upon knowledge of the former 
employer’s trade secrets in performing his or her new duties.” (quoting PepsiCo, 
Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
 103. See id. at 1460 (“We are free to consider the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine, and we reject it.”). 
 104. See id. at 1461 (“Our survey confirms the majority of jurisdictions 
addressing the issue have adopted some form of the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine.”). 
 105. See id. (“The decisions rejecting the inevitable disclosure doctrine 
correctly balance competing public policies of employee mobility and protection of 
trade secrets.”). 
 106. Id. at 146162. 
 107. Id. at 1463. 
 108. See id. at 146162 (“The inevitable disclosure doctrine permits an 
employer to enjoin the former employee without proof of the employee’s actual or 
threatened use of trade secrets based upon an inference (based in turn upon 
circumstantial evidence) . . . .”). 
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California is arguably the state most committed to opposing 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine, favoring a public policy of 
employee mobility and narrowly drafted employment 
agreements.109 Until the DTSA’s passage, California enjoyed a 
high degree of success in innovation because of the state’s 
emphasis on employee mobility.110 California’s reluctance to accept 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine promotes competition, including 
encouraging former employees to form start-ups.111 Refusing to 
apply the inevitable disclosure doctrine also generates positive 
impacts on creativity, innovation, and employee mobility.112 
Understanding the state law foundations and policy 
considerations behind trade secret protection and the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine lays the backdrop for the new federal cause of 
action governing trade secret misappropriation. The variation of 
state laws helps demonstrate why Congress felt compelled to 
create a federal cause of action for trade secret misappropriation 
in an attempt to bring uniformity. 
D. Creation of the DTSA 
The DTSA provides the first federal civil cause of action for 
trade secret misappropriation in the United States.113 One impetus 
behind creating a federal cause of action for this traditional state 
law claim was to establish uniformity for businesses and prevent 
conflict of state laws.114 Another goal of this legislation, as 
                                                                                                     
 109. See id. (noting that California courts are open to protecting trade secrets 
“through an employment agreement that is narrowly drafted for the specific 
purpose of protecting trade secrets against misappropriation”). 
 110. See Bessen, supra note 2, at 5 (discussing the positive impact that 
California’s refusal to recognize non-compete agreements has had on labor 
mobility and the success of Silicon Valley). 
 111. See id. (“[The California approach] promotes competition including the 
ability of former employees to create competitive businesses that . . . have the 
salutary effect of lowering costs to consumers.”). 
 112. See id. at 457 (analogizing the inevitable disclosure doctrine to a 
non-compete agreement and describing the impacts of non-compete agreements 
on innovation). 
 113. See Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 29, at 832 (“The May 2016 enactment 
of the DTSA created a federal, civil cause of action for trade secret 
misappropriation for the first time.”). 
 114. See Press Release, Orrin Hatch, U.S. Senator for Utah, Hatch, Coons 
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articulated by the press release introducing the bill, was to prevent 
foreign nationals and foreign competitors from accessing and 
stealing U.S. companies’ trade secret information.115  
Congress’s first attempt to regulate trade secret 
misappropriation at the federal level involved passing the 
Economic Espionage Act.116 This Act provides a federal, criminal 
cause of action for trade secret misappropriation.117 Members of 
Congress considered adding a civil cause of action to the Economic 
Espionage Act, but ultimately decided against it.118 Congress 
began contemplating a separate federal civil cause of action for 
trade secret misappropriation in the 112th Congress and 
ultimately created one during the 114th Congress with the passage 
of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA).119  
The language of the DTSA states: 
(b) Private Civil Actions. 
(1) In general.An owner of a trade secret that is 
misappropriated may bring a civil action under this 
subsection if the trade secret is related to a product 
or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate 
or foreign commerce.120 
The Act provides specific civil remedies for an action brought under 
the DTSA, which this Note discusses in detail in Part IV.121 The 
                                                                                                     
Introduce Bill to Combat Theft of Trade Secrets, Protect Jobs (Apr. 29, 2014) 
[hereinafter Hatch & Coons] (“Federal courts are better suited to working across 
state and national boundaries to facilitate [trade secret misappropriation 
litigation.]”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 115. See id. (“American companies are losing jobs because of theft of trade 
secrets every day. This bipartisan bill will empower American companies to 
protect their jobs by legally confronting those who steal their trade secrets.”). 
 116. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 18311832 (2012)). 
 117. See id. (providing a criminal cause of action to address the theft of trade 
secrets and protect proprietary information). 
 118. See 142 CONG. REC. 27111-12 (Oct. 2, 1996) (statement of Sen. Arlen 
Specter) (stating that “a Federal civil cause of action is needed” in protecting trade 
secrets). 
 119. Compare Protecting American Trade Secrets and Innovation Act of 2012, 
S. 3389, 112th Cong. (2012) (providing a federal civil cause of action and remedies 
for violating the Act), with Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, S. 1890, 114th Cong. 
(2016) (expanding on the 2012 version of the Act by changing the injunctive 
language and adding the whistleblower provision). 
 120. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1) (Supp. IV 2016)).  
 121. See discussion infra Part III.B. (describing the injunctive language and 
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majority of the Note’s analysis focuses on the injunctive language 
of the DTSA,122 which provides insufficient treatment of the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine—a problem demonstrated by the 
federal cases123 decided since its passage. 
III. Legislative History of the DTSA 
Despite the state law framework for trade secret 
misappropriation, Congress introduced and passed a federal cause 
of action for trade secret misappropriation.124 Understanding 
Congress’ key goals and intentions behind creating this law 
requires analysis of the legislative history of the DTSA. 
Additionally, legislative intent provides foundational principles 
necessary to understand how courts should interpret and apply the 
DTSA. The primary issue with the language of the DTSA is that it 
is insufficient to preempt the application of the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine. The cases decided since the passage of the 
DTSA demonstrate this insufficiency.125 Preempting the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine would align the impact and effects of the DTSA 
with the legislative intent behind the Act. Amending the DTSA to 
preempt the inevitable disclosure doctrine is the quickest and best 
solution to achieve uniformity among the states. 
                                                                                                     
remedies offered by the current version of the Act and past iterations of the bill). 
 122. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (b)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 2016)) (“A court . . . may grant 
an injunction . . . to prevent any actual or threatened misappropriation . . . .”). 
 123. See generally Fres-co Sys. USA, Inc. v. Hawkins, 690 F. App’x 72 (3d Cir. 
2017); Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., No.16-C-03545, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 71700 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017); Mickey’s Linen v. Fischer, No. 17 C 
2154. 2017 WL 3970593 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2017); Xoran Holdings LLC v. Luick, 
No. 16-13703, 2017 WL 4039178 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2017); Mid-Am. Bus. Sys. 
v. Sanderson, No. 17-3876, 2017 WL 4480107 (D. Minn. Oct. 6, 2017); UCAR Tech. 
(USA) Inc. v. Yan Li, No. 5:17-cv-01704-EJD, 2017 WL 6405620 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 
15, 2017). 
 124. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, S. 1890, 114th Cong. (2016). 
 125. See generally Fres-co, 690 F. App’x at 72; Molon, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
71700; Mickey’s, 2017 WL 3970593; Xoran, 2017 WL 4039178; Mid-Am., WL 
4480107, at *1; UCAR, 2017 WL 6405620; see also discussion infra Part V 
(focusing on the caselaw’s treatment of the inevitable disclosure doctrine in DTSA 
claims). 
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A. Congressional Intent Behind Creating a Federal Cause of 
Action for Trade Secret Misappropriation 
Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah and Senator Chris Coons of 
Delaware, the two sponsoring Senators of the DTSA, stated two 
primary reasons for pursuing a federal cause of action for trade 
secret misappropriation when introducing the bill.126 One purpose 
of this legislation was to create uniformity in the law of trade secret 
misappropriation and to prevent the conflict of state laws given 
that many American companies operate in multiple states.127 The 
second major purpose in proposing this legislation was to tackle 
the issue of foreign nationals and businesses accessing and 
misappropriating the trade secret information of United States’ 
companies.128  
Serious economic considerations supported establishing a 
federal cause of action for trade secret misappropriation.129 The 
estimated annual losses to the American economy caused by trade 
secret theft reportedly total over $300 billion.130 Congress 
recognized that trade secret theft costs American businesses 
money and American employees jobs.131 Given the prevalence and 
cost of trade secret theft in the United States, Congress wanted to 
bring the area of trade secret law under federal jurisdiction.132 
Congress gave additional rationales for creating a federal 
cause of action for trade secret misappropriation. One major 
consideration was the growing sophistication by which this theft 
occurs and the fact that preventing this theft is becoming 
                                                                                                     
 126. See Hatch & Coons, supra note 114 (listing uniformity of law and 
prevention of foreign nationals from stealing U.S. companies trade secret 
information as the primary purposes for the federal trade secret misappropriation 
cause of action). 
 127. See id. (noting the harmonization of U.S. trade secret law as a primary 
consideration behind this bill). 
 128. See id. (“American companies are losing jobs because of theft of trade 
secrets every day. This bipartisan bill will empower American companies to 
protect their jobs by legally confronting those who steal their trade secrets.”). 
 129. See S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 2 (2016) (including losses to the American 
economy and Americans losing jobs as an impetus behind the Act). 
 130. Id. 
 131. See id. (“[T]rade secret theft has led to the loss of 2.1 million American 
jobs each year[.]”). 
 132. See id. at 3 (“A Federal cause of action will allow trade secret owners to 
protect their innovations by seeking redress in Federal court[.]”). 
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increasingly difficult.133 Another major consideration was that 
trade secret laws were the only area of intellectual property law 
primarily governed by state law in the United States.134 Congress 
sought to bring uniformity to trade secret litigation to address the 
differences in trade secret laws across the states that can be 
“case-dispositive.”135  
Congress was aware of the inevitable disclosure doctrine and 
the possible issues that could arise under the DTSA because the 
application of the doctrine differs between the states.136 However, 
the Senate Judiciary Committee did not see the need to address 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine beyond stating, “The Committee 
notes that courts interpreting State trade secret laws have reached 
different conclusions of the applicability of the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine.”137 Thus, Congress essentially acknowledged 
the possibility of inevitable disclosure for DTSA claims without 
providing a clear solution. However, given the Senate Judiciary 
Committee Report’s statement that “[t]he DTSA will incentivize 
future innovation while protecting and encouraging the creation of 
American jobs,”138 it seems clear that applying inevitable 
disclosure in DTSA claims would be contrary to this articulated 
goal. 
B. Injunctive Language in the DTSA and in the Drafts of 
the DTSA 
In addition to the legislative history and congressional intent 
behind the Act, the plain language of the remedies section of the 
                                                                                                     
 133. See id. at 2 (“Thieves are using increasingly sophisticated methods to 
steal trade secrets and the growing use of technology and cyberspace has made 
trade secret theft detection particularly difficult.”). 
 134. See id. (“Unlike other types of intellectual property, which are primarily 
protected by Federal law, trade secrets are primarily governed by State law.”). 
 135. See id. (“Although the differences between State law and the UTSA are 
generally relatively minor, they can prove case dispositive . . . .”). 
 136. See id. at 8 n.16 (noting the different state interpretations of the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine). 
 137. See id. (highlighting Congress’ awareness of the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine, but its lack of providing for it in the Act). 
 138. See id. at 3 (indicating that application of the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine in DTSA claims would be counterintuitive to the goal of encouraging 
innovation). 
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statute also seems to indicate that Congress did not intend for 
courts to apply inevitable disclosure in DTSA claims. This analysis 
centers on the injunctive language offered in § 1836(b)(3)(A)139 to 
determine the preemptive effect of this language on the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine. This Note focuses on the injunctive language 
and remedies offered by the DTSA because courts cite to this 
language when applying the inevitable disclosure doctrine.140 
While the DTSA offers remedies by statute for violations of the 
Act,141 courts rely on common law rules in granting the statutory 
remedies that the DTSA offers.142 The statute states: 
(3) REMEDIES.In a civil action brought under this subsection 
with respect to the misappropriation of a trade secret, a court 
may 
 (A) grant an injunction 
  (i) to prevent any actual or threatened
 misappropriation described in such terms paragraph (1) on 
such terms as the court deems reasonable, provided the order 
does not 
(I) prevent a person from entering into an employment 
relationship and that conditions placed on such employment 
shall be based on evidence of threatened misappropriation and 
not merely on the information the person knows; or 
(II) otherwise conflict with an applicable State law prohibiting 
restraints on the practice of a lawful professions, trade, or 
business.143 
This language went through multiple changes throughout the 
drafting of the legislation.144 The pertinent language of the 2015 
                                                                                                     
 139. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 2016)). 
 140. See, e.g., Fres-co Sys. USA, Inc. v. Hawkins, 690 F. App’x 72, 76 (3d Cir. 
2017) (“Under the statutes giving rise to Fres-co’s causes of action, 
misappropriation of trade secrets need not have already occurred to warrant 
injunctive relief, threatened misappropriation is sufficient.” (citing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1836 (b)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 2016))). 
 141. 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (b)(3) (Supp. IV 2016).  
 142. See Fres-co, 690 F. App’x at 76 (interpreting the language of the statute 
to allow for the application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine in DTSA claims). 
 143. 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (b)(3) (Supp. IV 2016). 
 144. See Protecting American Trade Secrets and Innovation Act of 2012, 
S. 3389, 112th Cong. (2012) (“[A court may issue an order] for appropriate 
injunctive relief . . . if determined appropriate by the court, an order requiring 
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draft of the Act allowed the courts to grant an injunction “to 
prevent any actual or threatened misappropriation” as long as the 
order does not “prevent the employee from accepting an offer of 
employment under the conditions that avoid actual or threatened 
misappropriation.”145 This language is much less clear than the 
current DTSA. 
Congress possibly amended the injunctive language in the Act, 
at least in part, in response to a letter from intellectual property 
law scholars and professors, who had voiced concern that the 2015 
version of the DTSA would create possible federal recognition of 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine.146 Additionally, California’s 
United States Senator Dianne Feinstein’s concerns that the 
language could potentially “override” state law provisions that 
protect labor mobility could have influenced the Senate to amend 
the injunctive language.147 After the Senate passed the current 
legislation, including the more specific injunctive language, 
Senator Feinstein issued a press release stating that the law 
accomplishes the goal of protecting trade secrets, “while preserving 
the ability of workers to move from one job to another.”148 
                                                                                                     
affirmative action to be taken to protect a trade secret . . . .”); Defend Trade 
Secrets Act of 2014, S. 2267, 113th Cong. (2014) (“[A court may grant an 
injunction]if determined appropriate by the court, requiring affirmative actions 
to be taken to protect a trade secret . . . .”); Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015, H.R. 
3326, 114th Cong. (2015) (“[A court may grant an injunction] provided the order 
does not prevent a person from accepting an offer of employment under conditions 
that avoid actual or threatened misappropriation . . . .”); Defend Trade Secrets 
Act of 2016, S. 1890, 114th Cong. (2016) (“[A court may grant an injunction] 
provided the order does notprevent a person from entering into an employment 
relationship and that conditions placed on such employment shall be based on 
evidence of threatened misappropriation and not merely on the information the 
person knows . . . .”). 
 145. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015, H.R. 3326, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 146. See Letter from Eric Goldman et al., Professors’ Letter in Opposition to 
the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015 (S. 1890, H.R. 3326), to Hon. Charles E. 
Grassley, Chairman, Judiciary Committee; Hon. Robert W. Goodlatte, Chairman, 
Judiciary Committee; Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, Ranking Member, Judiciary 
Committee; Hon. John Conyers, Jr., Ranking Member, Judiciary Committee 5 
(Nov. 17, 2015) (“The current version of the DTSA also contains new language 
regarding injunctive relief that appears to implicitly recognize the so-called 
inevitable disclosure doctrine.”). 
 147. See S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 8 (2016) (reporting Senator Feinstein’s 
concerns about the injunctive language). 
 148. Press Release, Dianne Feinstein, U.S. Senator for Cal., Feinstein 
Statement on the Defend Trade Secrets Act (May 12, 2016) (on file with the 
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Between the draft (2015) and final version (2016) of the DTSA, 
Congress adjusted the language regarding the type of injunctive 
relief courts can grant in trade secret misappropriation claims 
under the Act.149 In the final draft, Congress specifically stated 
when the court can grant an injunction that will affect the 
defendant’s ability to enter into an employment relationship.150 
While it is possible that these modifications were an attempt to 
entirely prevent the application of the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine in federal courts, that has not been their effect.151 
Considering Congress’s intent and numerous edits to the 
injunctive language throughout the iterations of the Act, it seems 
clear that Congress did not intend for the DTSA to overly restrict 
the mobility of labor.152 Because the inevitable disclosure doctrine 
restricts the mobility of labor and stifles innovation, it appears 
contrary to the legislative intent behind the Act to allow its 
application in DTSA claims.153 Applying the inevitable disclosure 
                                                                                                     
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 149. Compare Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015, H.R. 3326, 114th Cong. 
(2015) (“[A court may grant an injunction] provided the order does not prevent a 
person from accepting an offer of employment under conditions that avoid actual 
or threatened misappropriation . . . .”), with Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, 
S. 1890, 114th Cong. (2016) (“[A court may grant an injunction] provided the order 
does notprevent a person from entering into an employment relationship and 
that conditions placed on such employment shall be based on evidence of 
threatened misappropriation and not merely on the information the person 
knows . . . .”). 
 150. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (b)(3)(A)(i)(I) (Supp. IV 2016) (“[C]onditions placed 
on such employment shall be based on evidence of threatened misappropriation 
and not merely on the information the person knows.”). 
 151. See Goldman, supra note 146. Congress could have been responding the 
letter’s concern about recognizing the inevitable disclosure doctrine with its 
amendments to the injunctive language. However, the amendments to the 
language have not prevented the application of the doctrine in federal courts. See 
Fres-co Sys. USA, Inc. v. Hawkins, 690 F. App’x 72, 76 (3d Cir. 2017); Molon Motor 
& Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., No.16-C-03545, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71700, 
at *1517 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017); Mickey’s Linen v. Fischer, No. 17 C 2154, 2017 
WL 3970593, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2017); Xoran Holdings LLC v. Luick, No. 
16-13703, 2017 WL 4039178, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2017); Mid-Am. Bus. Sys. 
v. Sanderson, No. 17-3876, 2017 WL 4480107, at *7 (D. Minn. Oct. 6, 2017) 
(applying the inevitable disclosure doctrine in DTSA claims); see also discussion 
infra Part IV (arguing that the language of the DTSA does not preempt the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine). 
 152. See discussion supra Parts III.AB (discussing Congressional intent and 
the variations of the injunctive language in the different versions of the bill). 
 153. See supra notes 1521 and accompanying text (detailing the inevitable 
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doctrine in DTSA claims also does little to achieve Congress’s goal 
of a uniform trade secret cause of action.154 Therefore, the current 
language of the DTSA does not sufficiently achieve Congress’s 
objectives because it does not preempt the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine. 
IV. DTSA Language Fails to Preempt the Inevitable 
Disclosure Doctrine 
The DTSA does not sufficiently preempt the application of the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine, as some scholars and practitioners 
originally thought.155 A careful reading of the language of the 
statute demonstrates why some practitioners originally thought 
that the DTSA preempted application of the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine. However, upon closer inspection, it appears that the 
language does not preempt all of the iterations of the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine, and thus creates issues. An analysis of the 
injunctive language of the DTSA, specifically subsections i, I, and 
II, is necessary to establish the conclusion that DTSA fails to 
preempt application of the inevitable disclosure. 
A. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i) 
While the language of the DTSA156 appears to detail the 
appropriate injunctions under the Act, it has created confusion for 
courts.157 The DTSA provides details on the remedies offered under 
the Act in Section (b)(3).158 The first grant of authority that 
                                                                                                     
disclosure doctrine’s function as a non-compete agreement which is restrictive on 
innovation). 
 154. See supra Part III.A (explaining the various objectives that Congress was 
attempting to achieve with this legislation). 
 155. See Sandeen & Rowe, supra note 15, at 451 (“Accordingly, the DTSA 
strikes a blow to states that recognize the inevitable disclosure doctrine by 
making the doctrine inapplicable in DTSA actions.”). 
 156. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(III) (Supp. IV 2016)). 
 157. See discussion infra Part V (discussing the judicial decisions after the 
passage of the DTSA that are seemingly contrary to the intent and language of 
the statute). 
 158. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (b)(3) (defining appropriate remedies offered under 
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Congress gives to the courts from the DTSA is the authority to 
“grant an injunctionto prevent any actual or threatened 
misappropriation” in § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i).159 From this plain 
language, it would seem that courts could grant an injunction on 
the basis of threatened misappropriation alone.160 As previously 
discussed, some states interpret granting an injunction on the 
basis of “threatened misappropriation” as synonymous with 
applying the inevitable disclosure doctrine.161 Therefore, the plain 
language of § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i) would invite application of the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine in jurisdictions that equate the 
doctrine with “threatened misappropriation.”  
Giving the courts this grant of authority and then stating 
limiting language in subsequent sections has caused courts to 
think that they are permitted to grant an injunction on the basis 
of “actual or threatened” misappropriation, without reading 
further162thereby, opening the door to inevitable disclosure. 
However, other language in the DTSA, found in subsection I, could 
be construed as limiting the application of the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine.163 The following discussion examines this language. 
B. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I) 
The plain language of § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I), which states in 
part, “[A] court cannot grant an injunction to] prevent a person 
from entering into an employment relationship, and that 
conditions placed on such employment shall be based on evidence 
of threatened misappropriation and not merely on information the 
person knows,” is not sufficient to preempt the application of the 
                                                                                                     
the statute). 
 159. Id. § 1836 (b)(3)(A)(i). 
 160. Id. 
 161. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine as a means of proving threatened misappropriation). 
 162. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 2016) (basing the injunction on 
actual or threatened misappropriation). 
 163. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I) (Supp. IV 2016)). 
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inevitable disclosure doctrine because of the order of the clauses in 
the language of the DTSA and subsection I.164  
Subsection I should act as limiting language on the broad 
grant of authority for an injunction on the basis of the threatened 
misappropriation.165 This language provides that the injunction 
shall not “prevent a person from entering into an employment 
relationship.”166 This language, on its face, would appear to bar 
application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine because the 
inevitable disclosure allows a claimant who demonstrates 
threatened misappropriation to obtain an injunction restricting 
former employees from pursuing subsequent employment.167 
However, subsection I contains another clause that further 
complicates what type of injunction is permissible by going on to 
state, “[C]onditions placed on such employment shall be based on 
evidence of threatened misappropriation and not merely on the 
information the person knows.”168  
Determining whether application of inevitable disclosure is 
appropriate under this language depends on one’s definition of 
inevitable disclosure. Some courts seem to think that relying on 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine is appropriate to demonstrate 
“evidence of threatened misappropriation.”169 Similarly, other 
courts have applied inevitable disclosure to enjoin employment on 
the basis of the competition between the two companies and the 
similar nature of the employment that the defendant held at both 
companies.170 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit in PepsiCo based its 
                                                                                                     
 164. Id.  
 165. See id. (stating that the order should not “prevent a person from entering 
into an employment relationship”). 
 166. Id. 
 167. See Farrell, supra note 12, § 2 (“[The inevitable disclosure doctrine] has 
also been used to establish threatened misappropriation of trade secrets under 
the common law or the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.”). 
 168. 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (b)(3)(A)(i). 
 169.  See Fres-co Sys. USA, Inc. v. Hawkins, 690 F. App’x 72, 76 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(“Under the statutes giving rise to Fres-co’s causes of action, misappropriation of 
trade secrets need not have already occurred to warrant injunctive relief. 
Threatened misappropriation may be enjoined.”). 
 170.  See Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., No.16-C-03545, 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71700, at *17 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017) (“[T]he allegations 
on the employment breadth and similarity of Desai’s work at the two companies 
are enough to trigger the circumstantial inference that the trade secrets 
inevitably would be disclosed by Desai to Nidec.”). 
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application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine on the idea that 
Redmond would not be able to “compartmentalize” the knowledge 
he acquired at PepsiCo and would, therefore, use it in his 
employment with Quaker.171 The rationale in the PepsiCo decision 
would seem to be impermissible under the DTSA because the court 
based its decision on the amount of information Redmond knew.172 
However, the language in subsection I, as it exists now, is not 
sufficient to preempt the application of the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine. From the order of the clauses and the broad initial grant 
of authority, courts could reasonably interpret that they have the 
discretion to apply the inevitable disclosure doctrine in claims 
brought under the DTSA. Courts can justify their application of 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine by stating that the injunction is 
based on “threatened misappropriation” rather than on the former 
employee’s knowledge.173 Courts can look to and rely on multiple 
factors including the defendant’s job role at both companies, the 
competition between the two companies, and the time worked for 
the company, to determine that threatened misappropriation 
exists.174  
However, the rationale behind the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine is to limit employees who go to work for competitors on 
the basis of their knowledge, regardless of the existence of any 
demonstrated intent or capability to disclose trade secret 
information. From a theoretical understanding of the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine, the language of the statute should be sufficient 
to preempt the application of inevitable disclosure because the 
DTSA prevents injunctions that affect employment that are merely 
based on what the employee knows, which would seem to embody 
                                                                                                     
 171. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d. 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The 
district court concluded . . . that unless Redmond possessed an uncanny ability to 
compartmentalize information, he would necessarily be making decisions about 
Gatorade and Snapple by relying on his knowledge of PCNA trade secrets.”).  
 172. See id. at 1270 (concluding that Redmond “cannot help but rely on PCNA 
trade secrets” because of his vast knowledge of the processes). 
 173. See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (b)(3)(A)(i)(I) (Supp. IV 2016)) (detailing that an 
injunction based on threatened misappropriation is permissible, while an 
injunction based on knowledge the employee possesses is not permissible). 
 174. See discussion supra Parts II.AB (detailing what factors the courts 
consider in their application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine). 
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inevitable disclosure.175 However, the plain language of the DTSA 
only provides a very narrow exception for when you cannot grant 
an injunction affecting an employment relationship, and allows 
plaintiffs to mount inevitable disclosure arguments.176 The DTSA 
states that the only time that it is permissible for the court to grant 
an injunction that prevents a person from entering into an 
employment relationship is when there is evidence of threatened 
misappropriation.177 However, courts are effectively relying on the 
other factors, such as amount of time worked for the company, to 
apply the inevitable disclosure doctrine instead of granting the 
injunction on the basis of “information the person knows.”178  
C. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(II) 
The DTSA provides further language to limit the type of 
injunctions that courts can impose in trade secret 
misappropriation claims.179 Subsection II of the Remedies section 
of the DTSA states that courts may not grant injunctions that 
“otherwise conflict with applicable State law prohibiting restraints 
on the practice of a lawful profession, trade, or business.”180 This 
language indicates that Congress did not intend to authorize 
restrictions on the mobility of labor, and that the DTSA allows 
states with a high interest in preserving the mobility of labor to 
refuse to apply restrictions on employment like the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine.181  
                                                                                                     
 175. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (b)(3)(A)(i)(I) (Supp. IV 2016) (prohibiting the grant 
of injunctions based solely on information an individual knows); see also 
discussion of PepsiCo, supra notes 5354 and accompanying text (conceptualizing 
the court’s definition of inevitable disclosure in PepsiCo).  
 176. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (b)(3)(A)(i)(I) (indicating that the statute only bars 
an injunction based “on information the person knows”). 
 177. See id. (“[C]onditions placed on such employment shall be based on 
evidence of threatened misappropriation . . . .”). 
 178. Id.; see also Mickey’s Linen v. Fischer, No. 17 C 2154, 2017 WL 3970593 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2017) (relying on the level of competition between the employers 
and similarity of job positions to apply inevitable disclosure). 
 179. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(II) (providing that state law limits the 
injunctions awarded in DTSA claims). 
 180. Id. 
 181. See UCAR Tech. (USA) Inc. v. Yan Li, No. 5:17-cv-01704-EJD, 2017 WL 
6405620 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2017) (describing that California continues to refuse 
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At least two ambiguities arise in reading subsection II. First, 
it is not clear from the language what “applicable State law”182 
means. The phrase “applicable State law” creates questions as to 
which state law will actually apply in DTSA claims. This issue 
came up in a case before the United States District Court of 
Colorado shortly after the passage of the DTSA.183 In this case, the 
court struggled through a “choice-of-law bramble” to determine 
what state law applied, per subsection II, to this DTSA claim.184  
In First Western Capital Management v. Malamed,185 
Malamed founded Financial Management Advisors in 
California.186 First Western Financial, a Denver-based company, 
acquired Financial Management Advisors and renamed the 
business First Western Capital Management.187 Much of First 
Western’s marketing and portfolio managing occurred in 
California where Malamed was still a resident.188 However, 
corporate control and major decision-making occurred in 
Colorado.189 Additionally, the Colorado office directed all hiring 
and firing of key personnel, including those in the California 
office.190 Through the course of his employment with First 
Western, Malamed continued to reside and work in California, only 
traveling to Denver three or four times a year for meetings.191 
After filing suit, the parties hotly contested which state law 
would apply, Colorado or California, for the purposes of satisfying 
the DTSA subsection II provision.192 The court determined that the 
appropriate inquiry was to determine “the applicable State law for 
                                                                                                     
to apply the inevitable disclosure doctrine, even under the DTSA); see also infra 
Part V.F. (discussing UCAR Tech. (USA) Inc, v. Yan Li in further detail). 
 182. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(II) (Supp. IV (2016)). 
 183. First West. Cap. Mgmt. Co. v. Malamed, No. 16-cv-1961-WJM-MJW, 
2016 WL 8358549 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2016), rev’d on other grounds, 874 F.3d 1136 
(10th Cir. 2017).  
 184. Id. at *9. 
 185. No. 16-cv-1961-WJM-MJW, 2016 WL 8358549 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2016). 
 186. Id. at *1. 
 187. Id.  
 188. Id.  
 189. Id.  
 190. Id.  
 191. Id. at *2. 
 192. See id. at *9 (“The DTSA also forbids an injunction that would ‘conflict 
with applicable State law . . . .’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(II) (2012))). 
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evaluating ‘restraints on the practice of a lawful profession, trade 
or business’ that often flow from trade secret injunctions.”193 While 
the parties argued that the place of the employment contract 
should be the applicable state law, the court reasoned that the 
DTSA does not turn on the existence of a contract, although one 
may exist.194 Rather, the court determined that “trade secret 
misappropriation . . . is more akin to a tort, and the choice of law 
issues should be analyzed under a tort framework.195 The Colorado 
court, applying its own choice of law rules, determined that the 
applicable State law was the California statute governing 
non-compete agreements.196 
The language “applicable State law” also creates a temporality 
ambiguity. It is unclear from this language if “applicable state law” 
means at the time of the passage of the DTSA, at the time of the 
alleged misappropriation, or at the time that the plaintiffs file suit. 
Because common law regarding the application of the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine could change over time in states, this could 
create potential issues in litigating DTSA claims.  
Because the DTSA does not preempt all state law, courts have 
relied on state trade secret laws to complete their analyses in 
DTSA claims.197 Therefore, since the DTSA’s passage, caselaw has 
addressed the inevitable disclosure doctrine, both in jurisdictions 
that endorse and prohibit its application.198 A discussion of this 
caselaw follows. 
                                                                                                     
 193. Id. (quoting the 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(II) (2012)). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. See infra Part VI.A (discussing the inconsistent outcomes that arise 
when federal courts supplement the DTSA with state laws). 
 198. See, e.g., Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec, No.16-C-03545, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 71700, at *1718 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017) (recognizing the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine in Illinois and applying it in a DTSA claim); UCAR Tech (USA) 
Inc. v. Yan Li, No. 5:17-cv-01704-EJD, 2017 WL 6405620, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 
15, 2017) (barring the application of the doctrine in the state of California and 
DTSA claims). 
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V. Caselaw Addressing the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine 
Under the DTSA 
Understanding the legislative intent behind the DTSA and the 
injunctive language of the Act, it may seem perplexing that federal 
courts are applying the inevitable disclosure doctrine.199 However, 
there is clearly a split in authority for application of the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine in DTSA claims.200 Multiple federal courts have 
applied the inevitable disclosure doctrine in cases brought by 
employers against former employees under the DTSA.201 One 
federal court, however, has not permitted the application of the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine in the claims brought under the 
DTSA.202 These cases create confusion for practitioners in 
litigating claims under the DTSA, particularly because many 
practitioners believed that the DTSA preempted application of the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine.203 Because the DTSA was only 
codified in 2016, these cases are among the firsts to interpret and 
apply the DTSA and do not rely on a great deal of case precedent.204 
                                                                                                     
 199. See Fres-co Sys. USA, Inc. v. Hawkins, 690 F. App’x 72, 76 (3d Cir. 2017); 
Molon, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71700, at *1517; Mickey’s Linen v. Fischer, No. 
17 C 2154, 2017 WL 3970593, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2017); Xoran Holdings LLC 
v. Luick, No. 16-13703, 2017 WL 4039178, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2017); 
Mid-Am. Bus. Sys. v. Sanderson, No. 17-3876, 2017 WL 4480107, at *7 (D. Minn. 
Oct. 6, 2017) (granting injunctions based on application of the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine).  
 200. Compare Fres-co, 690 F. App’x at 76; Molon, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
71700, at *1517; Mickey’s, 2017 WL 3970593, at *12; Xoran, 2017 WL 4039178, 
at *6; Mid-Am., 2017 WL 4480107, at *7 (applying the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine), with UCAR, 2017 WL 6405620, at *3 (refusing to apply the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine in DTSA claims). 
 201. See, e.g., Fres-co, 690 F. App’x at 76; Molon, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71700, 
at *1517; Mickey’s, 2017 WL 3970593, at *12; Xoran, 2017 WL 4039178, at *6; 
Mid-Am., 2017 WL 4480107, at *7. 
 202. UCAR, 2017 WL 6405620, at *3. 
 203. See Sandeen & Rowe, supra note 15, at 451 (stating that inevitable 
disclosure is inapplicable in DTSA actions); see also Weibust & Stark, supra note 
14 (“[The language of the DTSA] appears to bar injunctive relief under the DTSA 
based on the inevitable disclosure doctrine . . . .”). 
 204. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (Supp. IV 2016)). The DTSA was signed into law on 
May 11, 2016. Fres-co was argued less than a year later on January 12, 2017. 
Fres-co, 690 F. App’x at 72. Molon was decided exactly one year to the day after 
the DTSA was signed into law, on May 11, 2017. Molon, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
71700, at *1; see also Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 29, at 857 (“With the DTSA’s 
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This Note analyzes a total of six cases published since the passage 
of the DTSA that address this issue; five cases have allowed the 
application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine in claims brought 
under the DTSA and one case has barred its application.205 The 
cases applying the inevitable disclosure doctrine under the DTSA 
are evidence that the statute does not preempt the doctrine. Each 
case is discussed below. 
A. Fres-co Systems USA, Inc. v. Hawkins 
In Fres-co Systems USA, Inc. v. Hawkins,206 the Third Circuit 
addressed the issue of whether it was appropriate to issue a 
preliminary injunction in a trade secret misappropriation claim.207 
Kevin Hawkins spent sixteen years working for Fres-co Systems 
USA, Inc. before terminating his employment with Fres-co and 
going to work for their direct competitor, Transcontinental Ultra 
Flex, Inc.208 The court determined that because of the similar 
nature of the job roles that Hawkins held at Fres-co and 
Transcontinental, it was likely that Fres-co would suffer 
irreparable harm from Hawkins’s disclosure of confidential 
information to Transcontinental through the course of his 
employment.209 In Fres-co, the court relied on the language of the 
DTSA to grant injunctive relief on the basis of threatened 
misappropriation without referring to the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine by name.210 It appears that the Third Circuit stopped at 
                                                                                                     
enactment, we have a federal statute but little federal jurisprudence to guide us 
as to the meaning of many of its provisions.”). Two earlier cases mention the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine in DTSA claims, but the courts’ treatment of the 
issue does not advance the analysis in this Note. See Free Country Ltd. v. 
Drennen, 235 F. Supp. 3d 559, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); Chubb Ina Holding, Inc. v. 
Chang, No. 16-2354-BRM-DEA, 2017 WL 499682 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2017). 
 205. Compare Fres-co, 690 F. App’x at 76; Molon, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
71700, at *1517; Mickey’s, 2017 WL 3970593, at *12; Xoran, 2017 WL, at *6; 
Mid-Am., 2017 WL 4480107, at *7 (applying the inevitable disclosure doctrine), 
with UCAR, 2017 WL 6405620, at *3 (barring application of the doctrine). 
 206. 690 F. App’x 72 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 207. Id. at 73. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 76. 
 210. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(Supp. IV 2016)). 
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the language of subsection i in its analysis in Fres-co.211 The only 
language of the DTSA that the court relied on is the first grant of 
authority to grant an injunction: “[A] court may grant an 
injunction to prevent any actual or threatened 
misappropriation.”212 The court failed to acknowledge subsection I, 
which provides further requirements that the injunction must 
satisfy.213 
B. Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp. 
Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp.214 provides 
another example of a DTSA case where a former employer sued an 
employee who went to work for a competitor.215 The Northern 
District of Illinois addressed an alleged trade secret theft by a 
former Molon employee as a violation of the DTSA.216 Molon 
employed Manish Desai as the head of quality control, which gave 
him access to Molon’s trade secret information.217 Desai made 
copies of Molon’s engineering files and design documents and 
saved them to a portable thumb drive before leaving his 
employment to go work for Nidec.218 Molon alleged, without 
evidence of disclosure, that Desai shared this information with 
Nidec and that Nidec continued to use this information.219 In this 
case, unlike in Fres-co, the court conducted an entire inevitable 
disclosure analysis, ultimately concluding that Molon 
appropriately pled the relevant factors to apply the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine.220 The opinion reasoned that the facts 
                                                                                                     
 211. See id. (granting an injunction on the basis of threatened 
misappropriation per 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(Supp. IV 2016)). 
 212. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. 1836(b)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 2016)). 
 213. See 18 U.S.C § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I) (Supp. IV 2016) (prohibiting an 
injunction that affects an employment relationship based solely on the employee 
knowledge of trade secrets). 
 214. No. 16-C-03545, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71700 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017). 
 215. Id. at *2. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at *3. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at *4. 
 220. See id. at *1517 (analyzing three factors to determine whether 
FACING THE INEVITABLE 2243 
“justified the circumstantial evidence inference.”221 The court 
relied on the demonstrated competition between Molon and Nidec 
and the similar nature of the work that Desai did during his 
employment with both companies in granting the injunction.222 
C. Mickey’s Linen v. Fischer 
In keeping with the theme, Mickey’s Linen v. Fischer223 also 
involves a plaintiff-employer suing a former employee for trade 
secret misappropriation.224 Mickey’s Linen rents and launders 
various table linens, such as tablecloths and napkins, to hospitality 
providers and restaurants.225 Donald Fischer worked for Mickey’s 
for nearly twenty years before going to work for their direct 
competitor Alsco.226 Throughout his time with Mickey’s, Fischer 
rose from a Route Representative to a Regional Service Manager, 
and ultimately to Mickey’s Key Account Representative.227 As a 
Regional Service Manager and Key Account Representative, 
Fischer had access to a great deal of confidential information 
including customer lists and company financial data.228 Fischer 
began to engage in conversations with Alsco shortly after his 
promotion to Key Account Representative.229 After beginning the 
conversations with Alsco, Fischer resigned from Mickey’s.230 After 
resigning from Mickey’s, Fischer continued to work for them for a 
                                                                                                     
inevitable disclosure has been “triggered”). 
 221. Id.  
 222. Id.  
 223. No. 17 C 2154, 2017 WL 3970593 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2017). 
 224. Id. at *1. Mickey’s is one of three cases in which the Northern District of 
Illinois applied the inevitable disclosure doctrine in a claim brought under the 
DTSA, but it is the most illustrative of the court’s analysis. See also Cortz, Inc. 
v. Doheny Enters., Inc., No. 17 C 2187, 2017 WL 2958071, at *11 (N.D. Ill. July 
11, 2017); PrimeSource Bldg. Prods. v. Huttig Bldg. Prods., Inc., No. 16 CV 
11390, 2017 WL 7795125, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2017) (applying the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine). 
 225. Mickey’s Linen v. Fischer, No. 17 C 2154, 2017 WL 3970593, at *1 (N.D. 
Ill. Sept. 8, 2017).  
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at *34. 
 228. Id. at *4. 
 229. Id.  
 230. Id. at *5. 
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few weeks.231 Mickey’s did not place any additional safeguards on 
the confidential information that Fischer had access to because 
Fischer assured the Mickey’s management that he was leaving the 
laundry leasing industry completely and going to work in another 
industry.232 In his final days at Mickey’s, Fischer acted 
suspiciously with regard to Mickey’s confidential information.233 
Fischer began actively soliciting Mickey’s customers on the behalf 
of Alsco within a month of starting to work for Alsco,234 Having 
learned that Fischer went to work for their direct competitor, 
Mickey’s filed suit under the DTSA and sought a preliminary 
injunction.235 
The Northern District of Illinois employed a two-part analysis 
on the alleged misappropriation of Mickey’s trade secrets.236 First, 
the opinion reiterated that a plaintiff can rely on circumstantial 
evidence to establish trade secret misappropriation.237 Second, the 
court conducted an entire inevitable disclosure discussion.238 It 
began its discussion on the inevitable disclosure doctrine by 
stating, “[B]oth the ITSA [Illinois Trade Secret Act] and the DTSA 
provide that ‘threatened misappropriation’ . . . may be 
enjoined.”239 Applying the PepsiCo standard, the court stated, “‘[A] 
plaintiff may prove trade secret misappropriation by 
demonstrating that defendant’s new employment will inevitably 
lead him to rely on the plaintiff’s trade secrets.’”240 The court went 
                                                                                                     
 231. Id.  
 232. Id. 
 233. See id. (detailing that Fischer deleted all the data off his company-issued 
phone without permission and shredded key documentation). 
 234. Id. at *6. 
 235. Id. at *7. 
 236. See id. at *1012 (considering both threatened misappropriation and the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine). 
 237. See id. at *12 (“The Court instead infers from the substantial 
circumstantial evidence of Fischer’s misappropriation that he improperly took at 
least some of Mickey’s trade secret documents with him . . . .”). 
 238. See id. (“Wholly apart from the circumstantial evidence of Fischer’s 
misappropriation . . . [the] DTSA provide[s] that 
threatened . . . misappropriation may be enjoined. In Illinois, such threatened 
misappropriation may be addressed under the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine . . . .”). 
 239. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3) (2012)). 
 240. Id. (quoting PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 
1995)). 
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on to apply a three-factor test to determine whether the disclosure 
of trade secrets is inevitable.241 The factors were: (1) the level of 
competition between the former and new employer; (2) how 
comparable the position the defendant holds with the new 
employer is to his position with the former employer; and (3) the 
actions the new employer has taken to prevent the defendant from 
disclosing the former employer’s trade secrets.242 
Ultimately, the court found that Fischer would inevitably 
disclose Mickey’s trade secrets during his employment with 
Alsco.243 The Court relied on the inevitable disclosure doctrine to 
grant an injunction under the DTSA temporarily preventing 
Fischer from working with Alsco.244 The court based this 
conclusion on its reading of the DTSA as providing injunctive relief 
on the basis of threatened misappropriation coupled with Illinois 
case law, which allows defendants to demonstrate threatened 
misappropriation by relying on the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine.245 
D. Xoran Holdings LLC v. Luick 
Xoran Holdings LLC v. Luick246 demonstrates an example of a 
case where the inevitable disclosure doctrine directly hindered the 
launch of a start-up.247 Xoran Technologies (Xoran) brought suit 
against Luick, a former Director of Sales.248 Xoran is a research 
and development company that makes, among other things, CT 
scanners.249 Luick resigned from Xoran and shortly thereafter filed 
incorporation papers to start his own business, Tungsten Medical 
Network (Tungsten).250 Xoran found out that Luick “might be 
                                                                                                     
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. (quoting RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 177 F. Supp. 2d. 859, 876 (N.D. Ill. 
2001)). 
 243. Id. at *13. 
 244. Id.  
 245. Id. at *12. 
 246. No. 16-13703, 2017 WL 4039178 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2017). 
 247. Id. at *1. 
 248. Id.  
 249. Id. 
 250. Id.  
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using confidential information . . . to compete with Xoran” in the 
course of his new business.251 Xoran took steps to address this issue 
with Luick without resorting to litigation.252 Through various 
communications, Luick assured Xoran that he was not using 
confidential information to compete with Xoran.253 Xoran 
ultimately filed a trade secret misappropriation action against 
Luick under the DTSA.254 
In this case, Luick argued that the only theory of trade secret 
misappropriation that Xoran put forth was that Luick must be 
misappropriating Xoran’s trade secret information just by 
continuing to work in the CT scanner industry.255 Luick asserted 
that Congress rejected the inevitable disclosure doctrine by relying 
on the injunctive language of the DTSA.256 The court rejected this 
argument, holding that Xoran did not have to demonstrate that the 
defendant actually possessed and used Xoran’s trade secret 
information.257 The Eastern District of Michigan concluded that 
the plain language of the DTSA was not sufficient to preempt 
application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine.258 
E. Mid-America Business Systems v. Sanderson 
Mid-America Business Systems v. Sanderson259 provides yet 
another example of an employer bringing suit against a former 
employee after the employee went to work for a competitor.260 
                                                                                                     
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at *6. 
 256. See id. (“[A]n injunction to prevent actual or threatened 
misappropriation of a trade secret “shall be based on evidence of threatened 
misappropriation and not on information the person knows.” (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1839(b)(3)(A)(i)(I) (2012))). 
 257. Id. (explaining that the court will not inquire into the actual use of the 
trade secret information “for the purposes of evaluating the allegations of 
misappropriation under the motion to dismiss standard”). 
 258. See id. (“The Court concludes that the defendant’s argument [that 
Congress rejected the inevitable disclosure doctrine in the enactment of the 
DTSA] lacks merit.”). 
 259. No. 17–3876, 2017 WL 4480107 (D. Minn. Oct. 6, 2017). 
 260. Id. at *1. 
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Mid-America provides “large-scale storage and organization 
systems.”261 Kevin Sanderson worked for Mid-America as a service 
technician for a period of nine years, ending in 2016.262 While 
working for Mid-America, Sanderson had access to a variety of 
non-public information, including “costs, pricing, operations, and 
business processes.”263 At that time, Mid-America was an 
authorized regional dealer for Kardex-Remstar and an exclusive 
regional dealer for Kardex storage systems.264 Eventually 
Kardex-Remstar terminated its dealer contract with Mid-America 
and KHS then became Kardex-Remstar’s authorized dealer for 
most of the region that Mid-America had originally covered.265 
Sanderson began working for KHS as a service technician in 2017, 
shortly after terminating his employment with Mid-America.266 
Mid-America alleged that Sanderson copied and transferred 
confidential information before leaving the company.267 It further 
alleged that Sanderson solicited Mid-America clients during his 
employ with KHS.268 Mid-America brought suit against Sanderson 
under the DTSA for trade secret misappropriation.269 The company 
sought a temporary restraining order against Sanderson to enjoin 
him and KHS from misappropriating Mid-America’s trade secret 
information.270 
In assessing the trade secret misappropriation claim, the 
United States District Court for Minnesota started its analysis 
with the language of the DTSA.271 The court stated that in order to 
demonstrate this actual or threatened misappropriation, 
Mid-America had to demonstrate a “high degree of probability of 
inevitable disclosure.”272 Because Mid-America presented little 
                                                                                                     
 261. Id.  
 262. Id. at *2. 
 263. Id.  
 264. Id. at *1. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at *3. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at *1. 
 270. Id. 
 271. See id. at *7 (“Courts may enjoin actual or threatened misappropriation.” 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b) (2012))). 
 272. Id. (quoting Lexis-Nexis v. Beer, 41 F. Supp. 2d 950, 958 (D. Minn. 1999). 
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evidence to support their allegations, the court ultimately 
concluded that Mid-America had not demonstrated the likelihood 
of the success on the merits of its trade secrets claims against 
Sanderson.273 While Mid-America was not successful in 
demonstrating that Sanderson would inevitably disclose their 
trade secret information, the court did apply the doctrine in its 
analysis.274 
F. UCAR Technology (USA) Inc. v. Yan Li 
UCAR Technology (USA) Inc. v. Yan Li275 is the lone case 
barring application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine under the 
DTSA. This case concerned the employment relationship between 
UCAR, one of the largest chauffeured car service providers in 
China, and the defendant-employees.276 UCAR set up a United 
States subsidiary to conduct research and development to advance 
its technology.277 Yan Li and the other defendants spent over a 
year-and-a-half working with UCAR’s proprietary information to 
develop new technologies at the United States subsidiary.278 
Subsequently, the defendants resigned from UCAR via email.279 
UCAR claimed that Yan Li and the other defendants copied UCAR 
proprietary information to other computers and local drives before 
leaving the company.280 UCAR asserted a claim for trade secret 
misappropriation and a violation of the DTSA.281 
The Northern District of California refused to apply the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine in this claim because of California’s 
strong state interest in barring the doctrine.282 The defendants 
                                                                                                     
 273. Id.  
 274. Id. 
 275. No. 5:17-cv-01704-EJD, 2017 WL 6405620 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2017). 
 276. Id. at *1. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. See id. at *3 (“California courts have resoundingly rejected claims based 
on the inevitable disclosure theory.”); see supra notes 10916 and accompanying 
text (describing California’s interest in barring the application of the doctrine to 
encourage mobility of labor). 
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argued that UCAR relied on the inevitable disclosure doctrine to 
demonstrate the alleged trade secret misappropriation.283 
Specifically, UCAR alleged that the defendants “cannot separate 
out UCAR’s trade secrets and confidential information in starting 
a competing company in the exact technology space that they 
worked in for UCAR.”284 The court struck all “inevitable disclosure” 
allegations from the complaint.285 While the court refused to apply 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine in this claim brought under the 
DTSA, it appears that it based its decision on the California policy 
considerations of labor mobility.286 The court did not focus on the 
specific injunctive language of the DTSA in reaching its conclusion. 
G. Major Takeaways from the Cases Decided After the 
DTSA’s Passage 
A few common trends surface in the caselaw that discusses the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine in claims brought under the DTSA. 
In general, there seems to be a lack of clear textual analysis of the 
DTSA in these cases.287 Some of the cases focus too heavily on the 
state law understanding of trade secret law, rather than treating 
these claims as claims brought under a separate, federal cause of 
action.288 Other courts rely on their states’ policy considerations in 
accepting or rejecting the inevitable disclosure doctrine.289 
                                                                                                     
 283. UCAR Tech. (USA) Inc. v. Yan Li, No. 5:17-cv-01704-EJD, 2017 WL 
6405620, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2017). 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. See id. (referring to the inevitable disclosure doctrine as “impermissible” 
in California). 
 287. See Fres-co Sys. USA, Inc. v. Hawkins, 690 F. App’x. 72, 76 (3d Cir. 2017); 
Xoran Holdings LLC v. Luick, No. 16-13703, 2017 WL 4039178, at *6 (E.D. Mich. 
Sept. 13, 2017); Mickey’s Linen v. Fischer, No. 17 C 2154, 2017 WL 3970593, at 
*12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2017) (analyzing only 18 U.S.C. § 1836(3)(A)(i) which allows 
an injunction on the basis of threatened misappropriation, but not looking further 
to subsection I). 
 288. See Mickey’s, 2017 WL 3970593, at *12; Molon Motor and Coil Corp. v. 
Nidec Motor Corp., No.16-C-03545, 2017 US LEXIS 71700, at *13 (N.D. Ill. May 
11, 2017) (looking to Illinois common and statutory law to help decide a claim 
brought under the DTSA). 
 289. See UCAR, 2017 WL 6405620, at *3 (considering California’s interest in 
refusing to recognize the inevitable disclosure doctrine). 
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First, courts are applying the inevitable disclosure based on 
the language of subsection 3(A)(i),290 which allows a court to grant 
an injunction based on threatened misappropriation.291 The 
majority of any textual analysis given to the DTSA centers on this 
subsection in the cases.292  
Second, other courts are applying the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine in DTSA cases because their state trade secret laws 
endorse the doctrine.293 Both of the Illinois cases examined in this 
Note cite Illinois’s state law acceptance of the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine to justify the application of the doctrine in DTSA claims.294 
Lastly, the one court to refuse to apply the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine did so because of the prevailing policy concerns 
in its state, as opposed to relying on the language of the statute.295 
Because California has such a strong interest in labor mobility, its 
federal courts were unwilling to apply inevitable disclosure. 
H. Cases Demonstrate that the Current Interpretation of the Act is 
Not the Most Reasonable 
A court’s correct reading of the current injunctive language of 
the DTSA should encompass a discussion of both subsections I and 
II. For example, a court in the Northern District of Illinois, a state 
that does recognize the inevitable disclosure doctrine, would read 
                                                                                                     
 290. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (b)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 2016)). 
 291. See Fres-co, 690 F. App’x., at 76; Xoran, 2017 WL 4039178, at *6; 
Mickey’s, 2017 WL 3970593, at *12 (finding it appropriate to apply inevitable 
disclosure because the DTSA permits an injunction granted on the basis of 
threatened misappropriation). 
 292. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the courts’ interpretation of the DTSA’s 
broad grant of authority given in subsection (3)(A)(i)). 
 293. See Mickey’s, 2017 WL 3970593, at *12; Molon, 2017 US LEXIS 71700, 
at *13 (relying on pre-DTSA Illinois state law that endorsed the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine). 
 294. See Mickey’s, 2017 WL 3970593, at *12 (“In Illinois, such threatened 
misappropriation may be addressed by the inevitable disclosure doctrine . . . .”); 
Molon, 2017 US LEXIS 71700, *13 (looking to PepsiCo to endorse their 
application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine). 
 295. See UCAR, 2017 WL 6405620, at *3 (striking all inevitable disclosure 
allegations from the complaint because the doctrine is not recognized in the state 
laws of California). 
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the broad grant of authority to allow an injunction preventing any 
actual or threatened trade secret misappropriation, indicating that 
they could apply the inevitable disclosure doctrine.296 However, the 
court would then read subsection I and, depending on a court’s 
specific understanding of the concept of the inevitable disclosure, 
could reasonably still apply the doctrine under subsection I.297 If 
the Illinois court decides that applying the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine would not violate subsection I, which is reasonable given 
the plain language, the court would then need to confirm this 
decision by reading subsection II. Because Illinois State law 
permits the granting of injunctions based on the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine, the court’s conclusion to apply the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine would be permissible per subsection II.  
Conversely, a state like California could refuse to apply the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine based on the language of subsection 
I and California’s interpretation that the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine conditions employment on information the person 
knows.298 Furthermore, California courts have the ability to uphold 
their state laws and continue to bar the application of the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine per subsection II. 
The same statute permitting those disparate results seems 
absurd. It would appear that the current correct interpretation of 
the Act is not sufficient to preempt the application of the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine or to allow for the application of the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine in all circumstances. This interpretation of the 
Act is not reasonable. However, given the current language of the 
Act, it is difficult to argue that this interpretation is impermissible. 
Congress should amend the DTSA so that the permissible 
interpretations are both reasonable and responsive to the 
legislative intent behind the Act. 
                                                                                                     
 296. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 2016). 
 297. See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I) (Supp. IV 2016)) (allowing restrictions 
on employment based on threatened misappropriation and “not merely on 
information the person knows”). 
 298. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing California’s conception of the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine). 
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VI. Problems with Allowing Inevitable Disclosure to Survive 
DTSA 
This Note has established that the language of the DTSA does 
not sufficiently preempt the application of the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine. Therefore, it highlights the key problems that result if 
inevitable disclosure is allowed to live and thrive in federal courts.  
A. Inconsistent Outcomes Arise by Jurisdiction 
The DTSA created a new federal statutory scheme, and with 
any new scheme there will be difficulties in initial implementation. 
While Congress gives the courts directions with this statutory 
scheme, federal courts are left to read, interpret, and apply the 
statute to individualized situations. From the previous discussion 
of the cases applying the DTSA, it is obvious that the courts have 
some “gaps to fill” in the statute.299 Allowing federal courts to fill 
in the gaps of a statute provides a set of specific challenges. First, 
this interpretive exercise can create the issue of lack of 
uniformity.300 Second, allowing federal courts to fill in the holes left 
by Congress produces issues for determining which law to apply to 
round out the statute.301 Congress did not draft the DTSA to 
preempt state law and therefore federal courts can look to the laws 
of the forum state in determining claims brought under the 
DTSA.302 Because state trade secret laws vary, it is impractical to 
leave it up to the federal courts to correct this incongruity. 
                                                                                                     
 299. See supra Part V (analyzing how courts have applied their respective 
state common law conceptions of the inevitable disclosure doctrine under the 
DTSA); see also Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 29, at 87273 (“Thus, as with 
other federal statutes . . . it is likely that federal courts will find both the need 
and the power to fill gaps in the DTSA.”). 
 300. See Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 29, at 873 (“Because decisions 
concerning the nature and extent of those gaps, and the law that is used to fill 
them, may differ among federal courts, . . . the ‘imperfect’ aspects of the DTSA are 
apt to lead to a lack of uniformity.”). 
 301. See id. (“Assuming the federal competence to fill gaps exists, the second 
step in the federal common lawmaking process is to determine what law should 
be used to help fill the gaps.”). 
 302. See id. at 874 (stating that federal courts will consider the law of the 
forum state first when “filling gaps in the DTSA”). 
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The DTSA does incorporate state law to some extent to ensure 
that state law governing instruments will apply in federal court.303 
The DTSA also includes a state law carve out provision in the 
injunctive language which provides that a court may not grant an 
injunction under the DTSA that would otherwise violate pertinent 
state law.304 However, the DTSA does not directly address the 
potential choice of law issues that will occur in jurisdictions where 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine is barred.305 Additionally, the 
caselaw since the passage of the DTSA does little to clarify the 
choice of law issues.306 The cases thus far have looked to the 
language of the DTSA and found the application of the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine either permissible or impermissible on the 
basis of the state law recognition of the doctrine in the 
jurisdiction.307 As more and more federal courts analyze claims 
brought under the DTSA, the courts will have to fill in certain gaps 
where Congress did not speak with sufficient specificity. Whether 
or not to apply the inevitable disclosure doctrine will become one 
of those areas where courts must fill in the gap given the tension 
between the doctrine and the language of subsection I.308  
                                                                                                     
 303. See Sharon K. Sandeen, Senate Judiciary Committee Passes Amended 
Defend Trade Secrets Act. What Changed? (Guest Blog Post), TECH. & MARKETING 
L. BLOG (Jan. 28, 2016), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2016/01/senate-
judiciary-committee-passes-amended-defend-trade-secrets-act-what-changed-
guest-blog-post.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2018) (“[I]t [the revisions of the DTSA] 
makes clear that State law governing restrictive covenants will continue to apply 
as limits on the scope of injunctive relief.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 304. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, 130 Stat. at 376 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(1)(II) (Supp. IV 2016)); see also supra Part IV.C (discussing 18 
U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(1)(II) in greater detail). 
 305. See Sandeen, supra note 303 (“Issues of choice of law remain, of course.”). 
 306. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the only case to address the choice of law 
issue under the DTSA). 
 307. Compare Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., No.16-C-03545, 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71700 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017) (applying Illinois State law 
recognizing the inevitable disclosure doctrine), with UCAR Tech. (USA) Inc. v. 
Yan Li, No. 5:17-cv-01704-EJD, 2017 WL 6405620 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2017) 
(applying California State law barring the application of the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine). 
 308. See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (b)(3)(A)(i)(1)(I) (Supp. IV 2016)) (stating that an 
injunction cannot be based merely on information the individual knows); see also 
supra Part V.A.1 (discussing the language of subsection I in greater detail). 
2254 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2207 (2018) 
Because Congress did not directly address the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine in the DTSA, the application of state law to the 
issue does not create a uniform result. Congress intended for the 
DTSA to bring uniformity and consistency to trade secret law in 
order to support businesses operating all over the United States.309 
However, applying differing state law, especially with regard to 
what evidence a plaintiff must demonstrate to prove trade secret 
misappropriation, does not facilitate uniformity and could create 
choice of law conundrums. Specifically, allowing differing 
applications of the inevitable disclosure doctrine under the DTSA 
will create confusion for litigants and lead to forum shopping. 
Thus far, the facts of the cases brought under the DTSA have 
been relatively straightforward, with employers domiciled in one 
state bringing claims against former employees domiciled in the 
same state.310 However as the facts of the cases become 
increasingly more complicated, issues will arise as to which state 
law should govern any necessary gap-filling in applying the 
statute.  
The following hypothetical demonstrates how choice of law 
issues will arise when courts must supplement the DTSA with 
state trade secret laws. Mrs. Becker works in the California office 
of an Illinois-headquartered manufacturing business called Perry 
Industries. Perry Industries is incorporated in Delaware. Mrs. 
Becker leaves her employment with Perry Industries and goes to 
work for the California office of a Delaware-incorporated business 
with its primary place of business in Michigan. Perry Industries 
wants to sue Mrs. Becker for trade secret misappropriation under 
the DTSA. Which state law should apply to fill in the gaps and 
interpret the statute? The law of California, where Mrs. Becker 
worked and subsequently went to work for a competitor, or the law 
of Illinois, which seemingly governs the employment relationship 
between Perry Industries and Mrs. Becker? Or does the law of 
Delaware apply since both Perry Industries and the competitor are 
incorporated there? This hypothetical demonstrates that as the 
                                                                                                     
 309. See Hatch & Coons, supra note 114 (detailing the importance in 
developing a federal cause of action for trade secret misappropriation given the 
interstate nature of modern businesses). 
 310. See, e.g., Mickey’s Linen v. Fischer, No. 17 C 2154, 2017 WL 3970593, at 
*12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2017) (applying Illinois State common law in a claim brought 
by an Illinois business against a former employee domiciled in Illinois). 
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facts become increasingly more complicated, the DTSA will fall 
short of achieving its goal of uniformity and consistency. This 
leaves both businesses and employees unsure of which state’s law 
will apply with respect to the inevitable disclosure doctrine and 
unaware of what standards they might have to demonstrate in 
litigation, which can result in dramatically different results. 
B. Forum Shopping 
In addition, as employers begin to understand the beneficial 
implication of bringing a DTSA claim in a state that applies the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine, plaintiffs will be able to manipulate 
the jurisdiction to their advantage. Forum shopping will become 
prevalent and choice of jurisdiction will grow to be outcome 
determinative, which was one of Congress’ initial criticisms of 
state trade secret laws.311 The law will incentivize employers to 
find a tenable connection in order to bring their claim in a state 
that recognizes the inevitable disclosure doctrine. Additionally, 
plaintiffs will bring their claims in federal court even in states that 
do not accept the inevitable disclosure doctrine in order to 
persuade federal courts to apply a thinly-veiled version of the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine, even though that application would 
be invalid in state court.  
Further normative arguments support the DTSA’s preemption 
of the inevitable disclosure doctrine. The preservation of labor 
mobility and protecting the rights of at-will employees are key 
considerations in why Congress should amend the DTSA to 
preempt the application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine.312 
C. Labor Mobility 
 Cases decided since the passage of the DTSA have interpreted 
the DTSA to permissibly allow employers to prevent former 
employees from seeking work in the same field, even when the 
                                                                                                     
 311. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (complaining that variations 
of state trade secret laws can be case-dispositive). 
 312. See discussion infra Part VI.C (detailing the various policy 
considerations and normative arguments for encouraging the mobility of labor). 
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former employee has no intention or no demonstrated conduct of 
trade secret misappropriation.313 This line of reasoning threatens 
an individual’s livelihood without true cause and implicates the 
mobility of labor, which can have negative impacts on the 
economy.314 The number of cases brought by employers against 
former employees since the passage of the DTSA demonstrates 
that the majority of plaintiffs in DTSA claims are disgruntled 
employers who have an interest in preventing former employees 
from working for a competitor.315 Courts should require plaintiffs 
to demonstrate actual or threatened misappropriation by more 
than the circumstantial evidence standard offered by the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine when someone’s livelihood is on the 
line. 
Intellectual property law scholars have analogized the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine as a functional non-compete 
agreement that is not achieved by contract.316 Non-compete 
agreements restrict an employee’s post-employment ability to 
work for a competitor or start a competing company.317 In the 
modern labor force, non-compete clauses are nearly universal in 
                                                                                                     
 313. Fres-co Sys. USA, Inc. v. Hawkins, 690 F. App’x 72, 76 (3d Cir. 2017); 
Molon, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71700, at *15–17; Mickey’s Linen, 2017 WL 
3970593, at *16; Xoran Holdings, LLC v. Luick, No. 16-13703, 2017 WL 4039178, 
at *6 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2017); Mid-Am. Bus. Sys. v. Sanderson, No. 17-3876, 
2017 WL 4480107, at *7 (D. Minn. Oct. 6, 2017). 
 314. See Orly Lobel, Companies Compete but Won’t Let Their Workers Do the 
Same, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/04/opinion/noncompete-agreements-
workers.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2018) (“The liberty to move in the job market 
not only supports workers’ choice, equality, and wage growth but also creates the 
competition that catalyzes entrepreneurship, innovation, and overall economic 
growth.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 315. See David S. Levine & Christopher B. Seaman, The Defend Trade Secrets 
Act at One: An Empirical Study of the First Year of Litigation Under the DTSA 
31 (Aug. 25, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (“Approximately two-thirds of all 
DTSA disputes involve a current or former [employer] of the alleged trade secret 
owner.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 316. See Sandeen & Rowe, supra note 15 and accompanying text (describing 
Professors Rowe and Sandeen’s opinion that inevitable disclosure is a way for an 
employer to impose the restraints of a non-compete agreement in the absence of 
one). 
 317. See Orly Lobel, Intellectual Property and Restrictive Covenants, in 2 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW AND ECONOMICS 519 (Dau 
Schmidt, Harris & Lobel eds., 2009) (detailing the widespread use of non-compete 
agreements).  
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employment contracts.318 Orly Lobel, a scholar of law and 
economics who focuses on the intersection of labor and employment 
and intellectual property law, conducted research on the effects of 
non-compete agreements on the mobility of labor.319 Lobel found 
that there are many benefits to the areas and regions that 
encourage the mobility of labor and the “free flow of talent.”320 
Some of the key benefits to the industries and regions that 
encourage the mobility of labor are “industry growth, consumer 
choice, innovation, and regional competitiveness.”321 Additionally, 
non-compete agreements and restrictions on labor mobility can 
have negative impacts on human capital.322 
In her book, Lobel discusses the inevitable disclosure doctrine 
apart from its analogy to a de facto non-compete agreement.323 She 
views the application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine as a 
“very harsh tool of control of businesses fighting talent wars.”324 In 
cases that apply the inevitable disclosure doctrine, the courts more 
often choose to control the movement of labor rather than 
encourage its flow.325 Lobel’s work discusses the main problems 
with allowing inevitable disclosure to thrive in courts.326 One major 
problem with allowing the application of the inevitable disclosure 
                                                                                                     
 318. See Orly Lobel, By Suppressing Mobility, Noncompete Pacts Suppress 
Innovation, N.Y. TIMES, 
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/06/10/should-companies-be-
allowed-to-make-workers-sign-noncompete-agreements/by-suppressing-mobility-
noncompete-deals-suppresses-innovation (last updated June 11, 2014) (last 
visited Nov. 25, 2018) (describing the modern development of non-compete 
agreements becoming standard employment contracts) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 319. See generally ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD 
LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE-RIDING (2013). 
 320. See Lobel, supra note 318 (detailing the benefits that California, as a 
pioneer in rejecting non-compete covenants, has experienced). 
 321. Id. 
 322. See id. (“By restricting talented workers from career prospects, 
noncompetes can lessen the drive to perform well and invest in one’s own human 
capital.”). 
 323. See LOBEL, supra note 319, at 112 (“This is the highly controversial 
doctrine of inevitable disclosure, in which an after-the-fact de facto noncompete 
is created.”). 
 324. Id.  
 325. See id. at 113 (“The court defaulted to control instead of flow.”). 
 326. See id. (discussing the expansion of the inevitable disclosure doctrine 
since the PepsiCo case). 
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doctrine is that courts restrict talented members of the workforce 
from using their knowledge and talents.327 Additionally, an 
individual’s livelihood can be threatened when he is enjoined from 
working for a competitor, especially in specialized, niche 
markets.328 Furthermore, the application of the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine “alters the employment relationship without 
advance consent or compensation.”329 This Note endorses the same 
concerns that Lobel has about the impact of the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine on the labor market and innovation.  
Jurists also have similar concerns about achieving the 
appropriate balance between supporting businesses while also 
encouraging innovation and the mobility of labor. In SI Handling 
Systems v. Heisley,330 Judge Adams, in his concurring opinion, 
describes the delicate balance that the courts must strike in 
protecting the proprietary information of businesses while 
preserving the mobility of employees.331 The decision notes that as 
employees’ skills and knowledge become intertwined with 
employers’ proprietary information, “the legal questions 
confronting the court necessarily become bound up in the 
competing public policies.”332 Judge Adams argues that courts 
should be reluctant to favor the economic considerations of 
businesses over the livelihoods of individuals.333 His ultimate 
conclusion is that if the balance between an employer’s competitive 
advantage and an individual’s mobility of labor should be tipped in 
                                                                                                     
 327. See id. (“Key talent is prevented from putting to use its knowledge and 
skills . . . .”). 
 328. See id. at 114 (remarking that individuals can be barred from 
employment with a competitor all together). 
 329. Id. 
 330. 753 F.2d 1244 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 331. See id. at 126667 (Adams, J., concurring) (“[In deciding equitable issues 
with regard to a trade secret injunction,] a court cannot act as pure engineer or 
scientist, assessing the technical importance of the information . . . . [T]he court 
on occasion must apply the elements of sociology.”). 
 332. Id. at 1267 (Adams, J., concurring). 
 333. See id. (Adams, J., concurring) 
In light of the highly mobile nature of our society, and as the economy 
becomes increasingly comprised of highly skilled or high-tech jobs, the 
individual’s economic interests will more and more be buffeted by the 
employers’ perceived needs to maintain their competitive advantage. 
Courts must be cautious not to strike a balance that unduly 
disadvantages the individual worker. 
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either direction, it should favor the public policy implications of 
maintaining the mobility of skilled laborers.334 
VII. A Proposed Solution: The Labor Mobility Protection Act 
The current injunctive language of the DTSA is not sufficient 
to preempt the application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine. 
The congressional intent behind the Act335 and the over-reaching 
legal and policy issues336 indicate that the DTSA should preempt 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine. Congress should amend the 
Remedies section of the Act because of the legal and normative 
issues that exist when the inevitable disclosure doctrine thrives in 
claims brought under the DTSA. Congress should amend the 
DTSA to add a provision that encourages the preservation of the 
mobility of labor and adequately responds to Congress’s original 
intent in creating the Act. The amendment would address the 
issues that have arisen with the application of the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine in the cases decided since the passage of the 
DTSA. For example, the proposed amendment would help bring 
uniformity to application of the DTSA and encourage innovation 
by supporting the mobility of labor. 
In response to these concerns, this Note proposes a Labor 
Mobility Protection Act to modify the current version of the 
DTSA.337 The Labor Mobility Protection Act would serve to ensure 
that limitations on labor mobility are governed by employment 
contracts, not inconsistent common law doctrines. The text of the 
Act would clearly provide enough detail to cover any court’s 
definition or understanding of the inevitable disclosure doctrine. 
                                                                                                     
 334. See id. (Adams, J., concurring) (“Trade secrets are not . . . so important 
to society that the interests of employees, competitors, and competition should 
automatically be relegated to a lower position whenever trade secrets are proved 
to exist.” (quoting Thornton Robison, The Confidence Game: An Approach to the 
Law About Trade Secrets, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 347, 382 (1983)). 
 335. See supra Part III (describing Congress’s intent to establish a uniform 
federal cause of action for trade secret misappropriation that encourages 
innovation). 
 336. See supra Part VI (detailing the major issues that occur if inevitable 
disclosure is applied in DTSA claims).  
 337. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (Supp. IV 2016)). 
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This Act would establish a minimum threshold for the 
preservation of the mobility of labor in every state with relation to 
trade secret misappropriation laws. It would also preempt the 
application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine in claims brought 
under the DTSA, even in the states that allow for the application 
of the doctrine in state law governed trade secret misappropriation 
claims. This proposed Act is patterned after the Whistleblower 
provision of the DTSA, which provides protection to whistleblowers 
who disclose trade secret information to law enforcement to report 
potential violations of law.338 For example, the Whistleblower 
provision preempts any contrary state and federal law.339 Even if 
this amendment is considered more controversial than the 
Whistleblower provision, it is necessary to achieve the 
congressional goals of this legislation and to promote innovation. 
The text of the Labor Mobility Protection Act should state: 
(1) In a civil action brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1836 with respect to 
the misappropriation of a trade secret, a court may 
(A) grant an injunction 
(i) to prevent trade secret misappropriation on such terms the 
court deems reasonable, provided the order does not 
(I) restrict or prevent a person from entering into an 
employment relationship based on threatened trade secret 
misappropriation, unless such threatened misappropriation is 
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence; and 
(II) restrict or prevent a person from entering into an 
employment relationship based solely on information the 
person merely knows in the absence of an employment 
agreement to the contrary; and 
(III) restrict or prevent a person from entering into an 
employment relationship based solely on the similarities 
between the new employment and the former employment; and 
(IV) restrict or prevent a person from entering into an 
employment relationship based solely on the level of 
competition between the old employer and new employer 
(2) This provision preempts any state law that would authorize 
an injunction by State statutory or common law trade secret 
                                                                                                     
 338. 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 2016). 
 339. Id. § 1833(b)(1)(A)(i). 
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misappropriation that conflicts with Subsection 1 of this 
provision. 
Subsection I requires that plaintiffs demonstrate threatened 
misappropriation by a greater evidentiary standard than pure 
circumstantial evidence. This subsection still allows courts to 
grant injunctions that limit employment relationships on the basis 
of threatened misappropriation, however it removes the possibility 
that courts can find threatened misappropriation solely on the 
basis of circumstantial evidence. This language is necessary 
because some courts understand the inevitable disclosure doctrine 
to mean that they may grant an injunction based on an inference 
supported only by circumstantial evidence.340 
Subsection II addresses yet another way that courts justify 
applying the inevitable disclosure doctrine. Including language 
that restricts an injunction based merely on information the 
person knows attempts to be responsive to the Seventh Circuit’s 
understanding of the inevitable disclosure doctrine as articulated 
in PepsiCo.341 However, the language of subsection II still allows 
an injunction based on a violation of an employment agreement to 
remain valid. 
Subsection III restricts an injunction based solely on the 
similarities between the new employer and former employer. This 
similarity was an element in some states inevitable disclosure 
analysis.342 However, it is highly restrictive on the mobility of 
highly-skilled workers to restrict an individual’s employment 
solely because they are working in the same field or type of 
industry, especially when employees have industry-specific skills 
and experience. 
Subsection IV addresses another element of an inevitable 
disclosure doctrine application that should be restricted. Some 
                                                                                                     
 340. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing the circumstantial 
evidence definition of inevitable disclosure). 
 341. See discussion of the PepsiCo definition of the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(determining that because Redmond could not compartmentalize the knowledge, 
he would inevitably disclose trade secret information). 
 342. See Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., No.16-C-03545, 2017 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71700, at *17 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017) (“[T]he allegations on the 
employment breadth and similarity of Desai’s work at the two companies are 
enough to trigger the circumstantial inference that the trade secrets inevitably 
would be disclosed by Desai to Nidec.”). 
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states inquire into the level of competition between the new 
employer and former employer in an inevitable disclosure 
analysis.343 However, Congress should prohibit an injunction 
based on the level of competition alone. In highly technical, 
specialized markets there could potentially be only two businesses 
in the country that do the same type of work. Therefore, courts 
must require plaintiffs to demonstrate something further than 
mere competition for an injunction to be appropriate. 
Finally, subsection 2 preempts any conflicting state laws that 
would authorize an injunction for trade secret misappropriation in 
state law trade secret misappropriation claims. This preemption 
acts to achieve Congress’ goals of a uniform federal trade secret 
misappropriation cause of action.344 The application of separate 
“applicable state laws” under the DTSA will continue to cause 
issues of confusion and continuity, and therefore, should be 
preempted.345 
The Labor Mobility Protection Act is responsive to the key 
issues discussed in this Note. First, this Act helps bring the DTSA 
more in line with Congress’ initial intent in creating a federal 
cause of action for trade secret misappropriation. The language of 
the Labor Mobility Protection Act encourages innovation and 
establishes a uniform application of federal trade secret law in the 
way that Congress intended the current version of the DTSA to. 
Secondly, preempting the application of the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine curtails the existence of this highly restrictive doctrine in 
federal courts and better serves the interests of American 
businesses and employees. 
                                                                                                     
 343. See Mickey’s Linen v. Fischer, No 17 C 2154, 2017 WL 3970593, at *12 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2017) (stating that one factor in the inevitable disclosure 
analysis is how comparable the position the defendant holds with his new 
employer is to the position he held with his former employer). 
 344. See Hatch & Coons, supra note 114 (describing that Congress intended 
the DTSA to provide uniformity for businesses to litigate trade secret 
misappropriation). 
 345. See discussion supra Part IV.C (demonstrating the ambiguity of the 
language “applicable state law” in the DTSA (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(II) (Supp. IV (2016))); see also discussion supra Part VI.A 
(detailing the inconsistency that arises when states apply their own trade secret 
laws under the statute). 
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VIII. Conclusion 
This Note tells the story of three parties and their 
considerations in protecting trade secret information and 
maintaining the mobility of labor necessary for a developed 
economy. Employers and employees can have conflicting interests 
at times, and Congress attempted to protect the employment 
interests of employees and the proprietary information of 
American companies with the passage of the DTSA. However, 
Congress fell short in adequately protecting the interests of the 
employees with the current version of the DTSA. The sheer volume 
of lawsuits brought by employers against employees since the 
passage of the DTSA indicates that the DTSA should be amended 
to better protect the employment interests and labor mobility of 
employees. Furthermore, the DTSA in its current form is not 
responsive to Congress’s intent in passing the legislation. An 
amendment to the DTSA would bring the Act more in line with 
Congress’s original vision for what this law might achieve: 
protection of proprietary information that would encourage 
innovation.  
This Note proposes that Congress amend the DTSA with the 
passage of a labor protection mobility law that would better serve 
the interest of the employees without being overly burdensome to 
employers. In passing this Amendment, Congress would effectively 
preempt the application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine in 
federal court, which is what many assumed Congress had done in 
the first place. The inevitable disclosure doctrine has no place in a 
developed economy that requires innovation and collaboration, and 
Congress should refuse to give it life in federal courts. 
